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ABSTRACT
An obscure provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")
allows an immigrant convicted of a wide range of crimes that are grounds
for deportation to avoid this fate if pardoned by a chief executive. In the
current era of expansion of the categories of crimes that constitute
grounds for deportation and the shrinkage of equitable forms of relief a
pardon presents a vehicle for ameliorating these harsh effects. But few
presidents or governors take advantage of this opportunity, even when the
individual facing deportation is a long-term lawful resident whose trans-
gression occurred long ago. During a few months in 2010, New York
Governor David A. Paterson broke this trend to establish a pardon panel
specifically to consider applications from immigrants.
This article argues that Governor Paterson's resolute and courageous
example, though ephemeral, presents a model for governors in all states to
exercise discretion on behalf of individuals who deserve the exercise of
mercy and justice that a full and unconditional pardon confers, particular-
ly when the permanent exile they face far exceeds their wrongdoing and is
disproportionate to their well-established character.
Qing Hong Wu left China when he was five to immigrate with his family
to the United States as a lawful permanent resident. As a teenager, he was
convicted of several muggings. When he was sentenced to three to nine
years in a juvenile facility, he asked for forgiveness from his victims. Fif-
teen years later, having turned his life around, he was engaged to be mar-
ried, and was a hardworking employee at a real estate financial manage-
ment company. When he applied to naturalize, he found himself snared in
the intractable net of immigration laws mandating his deportation. His
predicament, including detention, severely affected not only him but also
other New York residents: his family, his fianc6e, and his employer. Even
the Family Court judge who, years before at his sentencing, had promised
to stand behind him if he turned his life around, became his champion.'
Faced with this poignant story, former New York State Governor David A.
Paterson took an unexpected tack: He pardoned Qing Hong Wu for the express
purpose of preventing his deportation. This chief executive went even further
to respond decisively to the harsh effects of deportation laws on New York
I Nina Bernstein, Judge Keeps His Word to Immigrant Who Kept His, N.Y. TIMis, Feb.
18, 2010, at Al.
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residents to form an innovative and, to this date, unreplicated pardon panel
established during the waning days of his administration.2
Governor Paterson took advantage of an obscure provision of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act ("INA") that allows individuals whose convictions are
pardoned by chief executives to avoid deportation. The decision of who to
pardon, of course, remains ensconced in the unfettered pardon powers of a
chief executive that the United States adopted from English tradition.' But a
pardon in a criminal matter can have a direct positive impact on an individual's
status by either removing all exposure to deportation or by opening up avenues
of relief that a conviction otherwise would bar.' The possibility-or, in many
cases, the certainty-of removal is a collateral consequence fully within the
executive's discretion to consider when making the pardon decision.
Governor Paterson intervened in the deportation process by resorting to par-
dons, an option familiar to the criminal justice system that was imported into
immigration laws almost a century ago in recognition of deportation's severe
and often cruel effect. He nimbly and effectively made use of the existing
federal law to accomplish a humane goal on behalf of at least a small number
of his constituents.
For this, he stands apart from the current aggressive, anti-immigrant initia-
tives of his gubernatorial peers who increasingly have chosen to take an openly
2 Danny Hakim & Nina Bernstein, New Paterson Policy May Reduce Deportations, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 2010, at Al. The panel members were: Chairman Mark Bonacquist, assistant
deputy secretary of the state's Office of Public Safety; Das Velez, senior advisor to the
Office of the Governor; Caroline J. Downey, general counsel of the New York State Divi-
sion of Human Rights; Linda Glassman, deputy commissioner of the Office of Temporary
and Disability Assistance; and Steven Philbrick, associate counsel to the Division of Parole.
Chris Gilbin, High Hopes for Paterson's Immigrant Pardon Panel, CITY LIMITS (June 23,
2010), available at www.citylimits.org/news/articles/4076/high-hopes-for-paterson-s-immi-
grant-pardon-panel#.UcnnE nVCso. The panel's membership included only fairly high-
ranking government officials and had no representatives from a range of other types of con-
stituencies such as clergy, victims' groups, immigration organizations, or academics.
3 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi),
INA § 237 (a)(2)(A)(vi), (2000).
' U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Alexander Hamilton wrote about the pardoning power of the
President:
As the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided, it
may be inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those
motives which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield
to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance.
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 74 (Mar. 25, 1788); see also P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Executive Clemen-
cy in the United States: Origins, Development, and Analysis, 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
251-53 (1997); see also sources cited infra note 28.
5 See infra note 115; see, e.g., Baca v. Holder, 461 Fed. App'x 555, 556, 201 U.S. LEXIS
22480 (9th Cir. 2011) (remand permitting consideration of effect of pardon on eligibility for
relief).
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defiant position against federal immigration enforcement. 6 Relations between
the federal government and the states over immigration regulation are strained
as states and localities frustrated by perceived federal ineffectiveness increas-
ingly assert themselves. Governor Jan Brewer described Arizona's restrictive
law, S.B. 1070, as "another tool for our state to use as we work to solve a crisis
we did not create and the federal government has actively refused to fix." 7 This
law provided a model and impetus for other similarly aggravated states' multi-
issue legislation. Some states, cities, and towns have passed individual laws
that implicate the lives, livelihoods, and liberties of immigrants.' Numerous
bills have been proposed (and some enacted) relating to housing, employment,
drivers' licenses, voter registration, and education.9
Much but not all of this activity is aimed either at strengthening immigration
enforcement with direct local participation or at indirectly undermining the im-
migrant's quality of life.10 Although some state and local legislatures and exec-
utives have taken a more immigrant-friendly approach by opting out of federal
programs such as Secure Communities" or passing ameliorative ordinances, 2 a
6 Republican Governor of Nebraska Dave Heineman asserted in 2010, "I'd be willing to
bet a lot of money that almost every state in America next January is going to see a bill
similar to Arizona's." Abby Goodnough, Governors Voice Grave Concerns on Immigration,
N.Y. TIMES, July II, 2010, at Al. Paterson's efforts were antithetical to his gubernatorial
counterparts. Seth Freed Wessler, Paterson Tries to Make New York the Anti-Arizona State,
CoLoRLINES (May 4, 2010), http://colorlines.com/archives/2010/05/paterson-triestomake
new york the anti-arizonastate.html.
I Statement by Jan Brewer on S.B. 1070, July 28, 2010, available at http://www.jan
brewer.com/article/statement-by-governor-jan-brewer-on-sb- 1070 (last visited June 4, 2012);
see also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism, 62 HAST. L. Q. 1674, 1675
(2011) ("The states, displeased with decades of lax enforcement at the federal level, have
taken immigration matters into their own hands.").
8 Stokely Baksh, How States Broke the Record on Immigration Bills in 2011, COLOR-
LINES (Aug. 22, 2011), http://colorlines.com/archives/2011/08/more state-legislatures
tackling-immigration_1aws.html.
I Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures, 2011 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in
the States (Jan. 1-Dec. 7, 2011) [NCSL Report], available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/immig/state-immigration-legislation-report-dec-2011.aspx; Kevin O'Neill, Hazel-
ton and Beyond: Why Communities Try to Restrict Immigration, MIGRATION INFORMATION
SOURCE, Nov. 2010, available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?
ID=805; Immigration Policy Ctr., A Q&A Guide to State Immigration Laws, 4 (Feb. 2012),
available at http://immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/qa-guide-state-immigration-laws.
Some of these ordinances have been declared unconstitutional in federal courts. See, e.g.,
Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch Texas, 675 F. 3d 802 (5th Cir. 2012),
reh'g granted en banc, July 31, 2012.
Io Angela S. Garcia & David G. Keyes, Center for American Progress, Life as an Un-
documented Immigrant, Mar. 2012, available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
2012/03/lifeasundocumented.html.
" Press Release, Governor Cuomo Suspends Participation in Federal Secure Communi-
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more generous use of the gubernatorial pardon, if properly administered, could
more directly benefit a considerable portion of local individuals (and their fam-
ilies) who are trapped by inflexible and unforgiving laws.
In this paper I urge expansion of the use of the pardon power at the state
level because it is one of the few remaining vehicles for avoiding deportation
available to any non-citizen with a wide range of criminal convictions, however
minor and however old. Increasing the use of pardons would indirectly restore
the formerly available exercises of judicial compassion and equity that Con-
gress has wrested from both sentencing judges in criminal proceedings and im-
migration judges in removal proceedings. The pardon process is imperfect and
at times politicized.13 But its deep roots in a favorable tradition of discretionary
mercy to avoid cruelty and injustice explain why it was written into and has
survived in the INA and why it should be more vigorously employed in the
immigration context. If clear, objective eligibility standards are applied trans-
parently, fairly, and apolitically, any chief executive (or appropriate delegate)
could institute a robust program that takes full advantage of the little-noticed,
underutilized INA deportation escape-hatch.
Federal law already confers on state chief executives the authority to have an
impact on an individual's immigration status through pardons. Unlike in Arizo-
ties Program, available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/06012011 FederalSecure
CommunitiesProgram; Kirk Semple, Cuomo Ends State's Role in U.S. Immigrant Checks,
N.Y. TIMis, June 2, 2011, at A21; Julia Preston, Immigration Program Is Rejected by 3rd
State, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2011, at Al3 (the governors of New York, Illinois, and Massa-
chusetts will not cooperate with Secure Communities).
12 For example, NYC Local Law No. 62, enacted on Nov. 22, 2011, places restrictions on
when the New York City Department of Corrections can turn over undocumented immi-
grants to ICE after their release from jail. Available at http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/
LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=967785&GUID=9F7C289B-A8D8-4A95-8882-BFO44CBB5EE2
&Options=ID%7cText%7c&Search=. Chicago Mayor Rahm Emmanuel signed the "Wel-
coming Cities Ordinance," a local law limiting the city's cooperation with the federal Secure
Communities Program by detaining only those undocumented immigrants who are wanted
for or have been convicted of serious crimes. Julia Preston, Obama Policy on Immigrants Is
Challenged by Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.coml
2012/07/11/us/obama-policy-on-illegal-immigrants-is-challenged-by-chicago.html?_r=I
&ref=il legalimmigrants. San Francisco's Sanctuary Ordinance, Administrative Code Chap-
ter 12H: Immigration Status, prohibits public employees from assisting federal immigration
enforcement. Available at http://sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=1069; but see Fonseca v. Fong
(No. CPF-07-507227) (2012) (invalidating this ordinance by holding that the San Francisco
Police Department had to report certain drug arrests to federal authorities). In the education
arena, in 2011 Connecticut and Maryland allowed unauthorized foreign nationals to be eligi-
ble for in-state tuition assistance. NCSL Report, supra note 9.
13 See, e.g., William Glaberson, States' Pardons Now Looked at in Starker Light, N.Y.
TIMFS, Feb. 16, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/16/us/states=pardons=
now=looked=at=in=starker-light.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
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na v. United States, 4 there is no conflict between federal and state law; federal
law positively allows a state pardon to waive deportation. Thus, instead of
having to pass controversial laws seizing some kind of role in immigration
administration, govemors can rely on existing federal law to establish programs
that avoid the draconian results of permanent deportation on families and other
community members. The same plea might be made for expanding the presi-
dential pardon that is rarely used to counteract the harsh effects of deporta-
tion." But a more localized exercise of a governor's discretion would entail a
more informed, accurate, and legitimate decision about "native" sons and
daughters that take into account the effect of removal on the community close
at hand.
As long as the immigration laws insist on the removal of non-citizens con-
victed of a lengthening list of deportable crimes-and as long as previously
available exceptions and waivers are foreclosed-deportations will increase.16
Yet, when individuals are deported, leaving behind family and jobs, it is the
states and cities where they formerly lived that are more likely to bear the
financial and social costs of deportation. Governors, therefore, can and should
turn this tide in deserving cases by restoring and expanding the use of their
statutorily authorized equitable power. This article will make the case for an
increased use of this authority to provide a tool to avert removal as an expres-
sion and extension of the "quality of mercy" that resides in the criminal law
universe into immigration law."
To put this proposal into context, Section I of this article reviews generally
and briefly the history of the executive authority to grant clemency to individu-
als convicted of crimes. Section II provides an overview of the pardon power
14 567 U.S. - (2012). In this case, the Supreme Court examined Arizona's attempt to
engage in immigration enforcement under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
Art. V, cl. 2, to determine how to resolve a conflict between federal and state law. Id., slip
op. at 7-8.
1 President Barack Obama granted a pardon on March 1, 2013, to a lawful permanent
resident from China who had been convicted in 1996 of a conspiracy to defraud. Josh Ger-
stein, Obama Issues Rare Immigration-Related Pardon, POLITIco BLOC, (Mar. 2, 2013),
available at http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/03/obama-issues-rare-
immigrationrelated-pardon-158297.html. This article reports that the last immigration-
related pardon was issued by President Bill Clinton in 2001.
16 Between 2007-2011, deportations based on criminal convictions increased from
102,024 to 216,412. ICE Total Removals, available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/
offices/ero/pdf/ero-removals l.pdf.
1 In 2008, the ABA issued a resolution urging "reinvigorated use of the pardon power to
avert removal." ABA Crim. Just. Sect. Comm. of Immig. Report to the House of Delegates-
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under the INA. Sections III and IV discuss the Paterson panel and a proposed
model for expanding the use of the pardon power.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL PARDON POWER
An exercise of executive clemency embraces a variety of measures. A par-
don is the most expansive type of executive clemency since it is usually un-
restricted, unconditional, nullifies the conviction, and can be issued before or
after conviction and/or sentence." As this section will discuss briefly, a pardon
eradicates the formal conviction and most of its legal consequences, although
the expressive message of a pardon about the character of the offender and the
effect on the stigma of conviction is less than clear. Other forms of clemency
provide some form of relief for the convicted individual, but they do not disturb
or mitigate the conviction itself or its after-effects. These options include sen-
tence commutation (reduction), remission of fines and forfeitures, reprieve
(postponement of punishment), and amnesty (usually granted to a group).' 9 Of
these options, however, only a full and unconditional pardon has any impact on
deportation.
Clemency not only takes different forms, but also it accomplishes different
objectives. The National Center for State Courts catalogued the most frequent
grounds for an exercise of clemency and listed immigration consequences in
particular:
* to correct hard cases (even under optimum conditions, exceptional
cases arise that cannot be left to legally prescribed rules; laws cannot
be drafted that will fit every conceivable situation);
* to correct unduly severe sentences;
* for mitigating circumstances;
* for innocence or dubious guilt;
* in death penalty cases;
* for physical condition;
* to restore civil rights;
* to prevent deportations;
* for political purposes and for reasons of state;
* for turning states' evidence; and
* for services to the state.20
8 "A pardon is an act by the executive (or others legally empowered) that lessens or
eliminates a punishment determined by a court of law, or that changes the punishment in a
way usually regarded as mitigating." It is, in effect a "[r]eassessment of moral guilt of the
offender." KATHLEEN DEAN MOORF, JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PuBIc INTEREST 193
(1989).
19 JEFFREY CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER 34 (2009).
20 SAMUEL P. STAFFORD II, THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CLEMENCY: LE-
GAL AUTHORITY, PROCEDURE, AND STRUCTURE Xvi (1977); see also Kristen H. Fowler, Lim-
iting the Federal Pardon Power, 83 IND. L.J. 1651, 1653 (2008).
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This list captures the historical bases for clemency, illustrating that averting
deportation is an unquestioned basis for clemency, on equal footing with miti-
gation, correcting injustice, and innocence. This ground may well appear on
the list precisely because of the long history of the INA pardon clause which
derives its force from Congress' understanding that some deportations might be
a disproportionate and unjust ramification of a criminal conviction. 2 1
A. The Development of the Pardon Power in Federal Law
The presidential pardon power is found in the text of the Constitution. Arti-
cle II, Section 2, Clause I permits "reprieves and pardons for offenses against
the United States." This almost unlimited power (only cases of impeachment
are exempted) was understood as a critical check on both the judiciary and the
legislature, but was controversial at the time of its adoption since it vested total
authority in the executive branch, a tradition that hewed a bit too closely to the
traditional absolute powers of the monarch.2 2 But, as Alexander Hamilton
urged, and this view prevailed, an unfettered presidential pardon power was an
important check on unjust deviations that might arise in the regular course of
criminal law and process.
Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative
of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The
criminal code of every country partake so much of necessary severity, that
without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilty, justice
would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.23
The pardon power's rationales and applications have changed over time as
systems of criminal law and procedure have become more layered and more
flexible allowing for more sentencing options and mitigation, and for more ave-
nues of relief for the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction. 24 But
fundamentally it relies on a notion of error-correction so that, when both the
legislature and/or the judiciary cause or reinforce injustice, there is an opportu-
nity of last resort to address this systemic failure. The most prominent current
examples of this use of the pardon power have been to redress death penalty
21 See discussion infra Section II.B.
22 For a detailed history of the uses and abuses of the pardon power in England, see
William F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. &
MARY L. R. 475, 476-97 (1977).
23 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Mar. 25, 1788). "The clemency
power, simply put, is intended to provide for a solution in cases where-for whatever rea-
son-normal legal procedures have produced an outcome that seems unjust." CROUCH,
supra note 19, at 29.
24 Daniel J. Freed & Steven L. Chanenson, Pardon Power and Sentencing Policy, 13 Fed.
Sent'g Rep. 119, 122 (2001), citing W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESI-
DENT 115 (1941).
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25 2cases and more recently, mandatory minimum drug sentences.26 In the fa-
mous example of the 2003 mass commutation of all inmates on death row,
Illinois Governor George Ryan justified his actions by citing to the "demon of
error" in capital sentencing.27
The message of the pardon power has evolved since this country's founding,
often causing considerable confusion. 28 On the one hand, this power followed
ancient traditions based both in justice and practical politics that pervaded soci-
eties up to and including the British legal system imported to the United States
prior to independence. 29 The presidential pardon reflects a power that has been
exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation [England]
whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours
bear a close resemblance; we adopt their principles respecting the opera-
tion and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules prescrib-
ing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who would avail
himself of it.3 0
Yet, when deciding pardon cases, federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, provide varying motivations or justifications for the pardon power. The
most prominent justification of pardons has been that this authority is based on
mercy, an "act of grace" accorded to the head of state.3 1 The most oft-cited
articulation about the meaning of a pardon appears in Ex Parte Garland,3 2 de-
25 Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issue of Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death Row in Illinois,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/12/us/citing=issue
=of=fairness=governor=clears=out=death=row=in=illinois.html/.
26 COLORLINES, Obama Commutes 22-Year Sentence for Crack Cocaine Conviction, Nov.
12, 2011, http://colorlines.com/archives/2011/11/obamas-first-bold-act-of-exec-clemency-
pardons-woman-with-22-year-crack-sentence.html/.
27 Kathleen (Cookie) Ridolfi & Seth Gordon, Gubernatorial Clemency Powers, 24 Clum.
JUST. (Fall 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/78073850/Gubernatorial-
clemency-and-pardon-powers-by-state-comparison-begins-on-page-9.
28 There are several excellent and comprehensive resources that contain histories of the
pardon power with particular emphasis on the federal system. See CROUCH, supra note 19;
MOORE, supra note 18; Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained; Wresting the Par-
doning Power from the King, 69 TEx. L. REV. 569 (1990-1991); Samuel T. Morrison, The
Politics of Grace: On the Moral Justification of Executive Clemency, 9 BuFF. L. REV. 1
(2005); Philip P. House, Forgive and Forget: Honoring Full and Unconditional Pardons, 41
MAINE L. REV. 272 (1989); Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100
J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169 (2010); Duker, supra note 22.
29 CROUCH, supra note 19, at 10-14 (summarizing the history of clemency).
30 United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160 (1833) (quoted in Burdick v. United States,
236 U.S. 79, 269 (1914)).
31 "A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution
of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the
law inflicts for a crime he has committed." Wilson, 32 U.S. at 160-61.
32 71 U.S. 333 (1866).
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cided in an era where pardons were an important part of post-Civil War con-
flict normalization.33 In holding that Garland, a lawyer who had received a
presidential pardon for his role in the Confederacy, would be restored to all of
his political and civil rights, the Court discussed the nature and effect of the
pardon in a discourse on the history of Greece, Rome, Spain, and France.3 4 The
Court famously articulated its broad understanding of the effect of a pardon:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the
guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punish-
ment and blots out the existence of the guilt, so that in the eye of the law
the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense....
[I]t makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
capacity.3 5
Garland's notion that a pardon has a cleansing effect, returning the offender
to a state of pre-conviction innocence, has eroded over time. Although the
paragraph above is often quoted, the Supreme Court has recognized that a par-
don does not erase the past.36
The "act of grace" rationale furthers retributive goals by granting clemency
in cases when an individual deserves not to be punished at all, does not deserve
the criminal punishment as imposed, or should not have to suffer additional
impairments that might result from the conviction. Although a pardon might be
granted after a sentence is served or a punishment completed, the pardon repre-
sents a conclusion that the individual deserves to be treated differently than the
law or other circumstances may have determined in the past.
Over time, pardons have also served other purposes. After the Civil War,
they helped to reunify the country37 and after the Vietnam War to restore rights
to draft resisters.38 The "act of grace" rationale competes with a "public wel-
fare" theory of pardons that sees presidential clemency as a decision justified
by its benefit to the public interest. In 1927, in Biddle v. Perovich, a case in
33 CROUCH, supra note 19, at 41-46.
34 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 348-50 (1866).
3 Id. at 381.
36 In United States v. Knote, the Supreme Court stated:
It does not make amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by
the offender in his person by imprisonment, forced labor, otherwise; it does not given
compensation for what has been done of suffered, nor does it impose upon the govern-
ment any obligation to give it. The offence being established by judicial proceedings,
that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been
rightfully done and justly suffered and no satisfaction for it can be required.
95 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1877).
3 CROUCH, supra note 19, at 11, 40-43; MOORE, supra note 18, at 51-52.
38 President Jimmy Carter granted a general amnesty to Vietnam War draft evaders.
Proclamation 4483, 42 Fed. Reg. 4391 (Jan. 21, 1977); see also MOORE, supra note 18, at
81.
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which President Taft commuted a death sentence over the objection of the de-
fendant, Justice Holmes stated:
A pardon is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to
possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted it
is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will
be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed. 39
Thus, the "public interest" theory posits that a pardon should only be exer-
cised if it benefits the public, and not simply because the individual deserves
some leniency or remediation. But not all public interests are rooted in essen-
tial fairness and may be largely policy-driven, expedient, or actually impose
unfair outcomes such as the acceptance of an unconscionable condition.40
More often, the pardon has hybrid justifications as both an act of grace and an
act of error-correction in the name of justice, thus benefitting both the individu-
al and the public interest. 41
On occasion, pardons appear motivated by political considerations and favor-
itism. Fueled by these rationales, these pardons may lack transparency. A con-
troversial presidential act draws the attention of the "court of public opinion"
such as happened when President Gerald Ford pardoned President Richard Nix-
on,42 when the first President George Bush (I) pardoned individuals involved in
the Iran-Contra Scandal,43 or when President Bill Clinton ratcheted up his par-
don record for the benefit of people with some personal connections during his
last days in office." With impeachment or non-reelection the only options to
39 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
40 Pardons have been used as a tool to compel testimony during criminal investigations.
In this context, Garland's "blotting out" metaphor was indirectly repudiated in Burdick v.
United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915), in which a newspaper editor subpoenaed to testify before
a grand jury refused a pardon, in effect immunity, designed to coerce his testimony. Noting
that a retrospective pardon might eradicate guilt, the Court recognized that a pardon accepted
without any adjudication may effectively constitute a confession of guilt and thus no one
could be forced to accept one. Id. at 91.
4 In his comprehensive book, Jeffrey Crouch argues that the recent self-interested clem-
ency decisions of Presidents Ford and Clinton may have abused the delicate system but not
to the extent of jettisoning it altogether. CROUCH, supra note 19, at 149.
42 MOORE, supra note 18, at 80-81 (arguing that this was an example of using a pardon as
a "tool for the public good"); CROUCH, supra note 19, at 73-79.
43 CROUCH, supra note 19, at 105-07; David Johnston, Bush Pardons 6 in Iran Affair,
Averting a Weinberger Trial: Prosecutor Assails "Cover-Up," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1992,
at Al.
" Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIM-
INOLOGY 1169, 1195-1200 (2010); see also, e.g., Jonathan Peterson & Lisa Getter, Clinton
Pardons Raise Questions of Timing, Motive, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2001, available at http://
articles.latimes.com/2001/jan/28/news/mn=18078/; George Lardner, Jr. Op-Ed, A Pardon to
Remember, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2008, at A21; Jessica Reaves, The Marc Rich Case: A
Primer, TIME, Feb. 13, 2001, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,
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challenge the executive decision, there really is no way to force a retraction of a
pardon. Many chief executives more actively pardon at the end of their terms
so they minimize the risk of political fallout. But for routine pardons (to the
extent that any pardon could be called "routine"), hybrid explanations that com-
bine retributive and utilitarian rationales typify the majority of pardons that
avoid wide public notice.
If the reasons for granting pardons are often conflated, the significance of a
pardon is even less clear. A pardon does not revise history to erase the basic
fact of conviction, nor does it eliminate the social stigma associated with the
commission of the crime. Thus, the Garland return-to-innocence paradigm has
little lasting influence on the understanding of a pardon in many circumstances.
More recent cases have made a distinction between the effects of the pardon on
the consequences of the conviction as opposed to the undisputed facts of the
commission of the crime.45 The pardon relieves the offender from the disabili-
ties of the conviction, but does not necessarily constitute a finding of innocence
or even a restoration of good character.46
It is clear, however, that, because pardons are unreviewable by their very
nature, the buck stops with the executive.47 This vests both opportunities for
mercy or to correct an unjust course, as well as responsibility to exercise this
power in a principled fashion. It is not surprising that many executives resort
to this power sparingly and with trepidation.
B. Federal Pardons in Immigration Cases
Samuel Morrison, a former staff attorney in the U.S. Pardon Office, reports a
long history of pardon applications to avoid deportation even before the recent
era.48 Despite the declining use of federal pardons, immigration cases now
99302,00.html#ixzzlxgw2Fzer. But see William Jefferson Clinton, Op Ed, My Reasons for
the Pardons, N.Y. TImS, Feb. 18, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/18/
opinion/my=reasons=for=the=pardons.html?pagewanted=all&svc=pm.
45 A conviction that is pardoned voids punishment so it also eliminates other restrictions
on basic civil rights such as the right to vote, serve on a jury, or obtain a business license.
Bjerkan v. United States, 529 F.2d 125, 128 (7th Cir. 1983).
46 Id. at 128 n.2 (7th Cir. 1983), quoting Samuel Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out
Guilt?, 28 HARV. L. REv. 647, 653 (1915) ("Although the effects of the commission of the
offense linger after a pardon, the effects of the conviction are all but wiped out."); see also
United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 958-59 (3d Cir. 1990). Not all commentators agree
with this view. See, e.g., Philip P. Houle, Forgive and Forget: Honoring Full and Uncondi-
tional Pardons, 41 MAINE L.R. 273, 274 (1989) (expressly disagreeing with Williston and
arguing that a full and unconditional pardon "actually blots out any guilt or infamy resulting
from a criminal conviction, and . . . restores the character and standing of the pardoned
individual in the eyes of the law).
47 "[Plardon and commutation decisions . . . are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for
judicial review." Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 276 (1998).
48 The author cites to only two examples after 2000 of presidential pardons that directly
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make up a large proportion of the applications filed with the U.S. Pardon Office
due to the non-citizens' lack of other options.49 Notwithstanding these claims,
over the 29-year period from 1928-1953, only 197 of the 5,674 pardon appli-
cants were granted pardons to avoid deportation.o
Although pardons are rare in general, in 1995, the Office of Legal Counsel of
the Department of Justice ("OLC") issued a memorandum generously interpret-
ing the scope and effect of the pardon power in immigration cases.5 ' This
memorandum concluded that "a full and unconditional presidential pardon pre-
cludes the exercise of the authority to deport a convicted alien under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2)." 52 In particular, the OLC disputed the position of the then Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service that the pardon clause did not apply to any
crimes other than those enumerated in that sub-section. Citing the broad lan-
guage of Garland, the opinion stated that deportation was the kind of disability
that a pardon was intended to remove, an adverse consequence "regardless of
whether they are viewed as 'punishment' for purposes of invoking other consti-
tutional provisions." 53 Morrison argues that excluding particular crimes from
the scope of the pardon clause violates equal protection because Congress is
interfering with the absolute executive power to pardon.54 There is, however,
no current evidence that the OLC's position is being followed by any agency or
court with authority over deportation decisions.
II. A HISTORY OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
LAW PARDON CLAUSE
In 2010, Governor Paterson seemed like a bold pioneer venturing into new
affected the recipient's immigration status. Samuel T. Morrison, Presidential Pardons and
Immigration Law, 6 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 253, 261 n.32 (2010).
49 Margaret Colgate Love, Remarks at Symposium, Pardons: The Power Nobody Wants,
The New School, Oct. 26, 2011, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DqEO5v
JhZ3Q,1:08:10. Highly knowledgeable and a former U.S. Pardon Attorney, Ms. Love is a
big advocate of the expanded use of state pardons and a supporter of Governor Paterson's
pardon initiative.
s0 Id. Morrison provides a slightly different number for the same time period: 192. Mor-
rison, supra note 48, at 261, n.32. The yearly total clemency statistics are reported by the
Department of Justice, available at http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm.
5' Effects of a Presidential Pardon: Memorandum for the Pardon Attorney 19 U.S. Op.
O.L.C. 160 (June 19, 1995), available at http://www.justice.gove/olc/pardon3.19.htm.
52 Id. This section corresponds to current INA § 237(a)(2).
53 Id. at 10 n.3.
" Morrison, Presidential Pardons, supra note 48, at 258 n.2, 340-41. The author argues
that an executive pardon operates to nullify any conviction so that the current limitations
under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iv) are an invalid interference with the pardon power.
1s The only reported federal decision to even mention the OLC memorandum dismissed it
as inapplicable in a footnote. Aguilera-Montero v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1248, 1255 n.9 (9th
Cir. 2008). No reported BIA decisions discuss the memorandum.
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territory, but actually for almost one hundred years an otherwise deportable
non-citizen unfortunate to be the beneficiary of an executive pardon could
avoid removal. The "pardon proviso" or "pardon clause" has been a benefit in
federal immigration law for non-citizens deportable due to criminal convictions
since those grounds of deportation were first codified in 1917. Although a
pardon can avert the loss of or restore the use of many civil disabilities result-
ing from a conviction, by inserting the pardon clause from the outset, the draft-
ers of U.S. immigration laws recognized that a pardon unquestionably could
prevent deportation, a consequence of conviction in a category by itself-the
loss "of all that makes life worth living."56
While the current pardon clause differs from the original version in some
respects, as will be discussed below, its rationale is deeply rooted in early-
twentieth-century law. It perseveres today, although undeniably underutilized,
despite other more significant changes to the statute and developments in case
law.
A. The Immigration Act of 1917
The pardon proviso made its legislative debut in the Immigration Act of
1917, the first federal immigration statute to systematically codify grounds of
deportation in addition to collecting all previously enacted provisions regarding
exclusion in one law.5 7 This Act was the most comprehensive federal statute
since Congress began to regulate immigration. Congress defined the bases for
deportation and any exceptions or defenses. Section 19 of the 1917 Act author-
ized the detention and deportation of, inter alia, any "criminal alien," a status
established by the nature of the crime, the length of the sentence imposed, and
the amount of time the non-citizen has been in the United States.
56 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
51 Immigration Act of 1917, H.R. 10384, Pub. L. No. 301, Chap. 29, Feb. 5, 1917, 39
Stat. 889-890 [hereinafter "1917 Act"]. See also DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NA-
nON 133-34 (2007). The full title of this legislation is "An Act to Regulate the Immigration
of Aliens to, and the Residence of Aliens in, the United States." Earlier statutes had allowed
for removal of individuals who had entered in violation of the law. Immigration Act of
March 3, 1891, Ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084; Act of Feb. 20, 1907, Ch. 11345, 34 Stat. 898. For a
discussion of this history, see Siegfried Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully
Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578, 1613-18
(1959). A conviction is defined by INA §101(a)(48) as a formal judgment of guilt where
some form of punishment has been imposed.
58 Section 19 of the 1917 Act made the following convicted criminals deportable:
Who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of a
conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five
years after the entry of the alien to the United States, or
Who is hereafter sentenced more than once to such a term of imprisonment because of
conviction in this country of any crime involving moral turpitude, committed at any
time after entry, or
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In addition to setting forth the particular crimes for which a non-citizen could
be deported, the 1917 Act empowered both the executive and the judiciary to
thwart deportation. Section 19 of the Act also set forth the following proviso
relating to executive pardons:
That the provision of this section respecting the deportation of aliens con-
victed of a crime involving moral turpitude shall not apply to one who has
been pardoned, nor shall such deportation be made or directed if the court
sentencing such alien for such crime shall, at the time of imposing judg-
ment or passing sentence make a recommendation to the Secretary of La-
bor that such alien shall not be deported in pursuance of this act.5 9
The statute exempted from deportation anyone convicted of a crime involv-
ing moral turpitude ("CIMT") who had been pardoned, without any further
qualifications on that term. Although it does not specify from whom a pardon
would issue, there is no doubt that the clause refers to the chief executive of
either the federal or state government, the traditional holders of the pardon
authority.
The pardon clause appeared in this immigration legislation without debate or
fanfare. This contrasts to the more contentious provision in Section 19 al-
lowing a judicial recommendation to prevent deportation.60 Legislators wran-
gled over both the need for and the timing of that recommendation. Those who
spoke against an open-ended opportunity for the sentencing judge to intervene
prevailed so that the final version contained a limitation of thirty days after the
time sentence was imposed. That recommendation, which later became known
as a JRAD, or "judicial recommendation against deportation," was binding on
the immigration adjudicator, 6' at that time the Department of Labor, until 1990
Who was convicted of, or who admits the commission, prior to entry of a felony or
other crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.
The successor of the first two clauses can be found today in 8 U.S.C.A § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii),
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii). Because a person with this background would be inadmissible
under 8 U.S.C.A. § I l82(a)(2)(A)(i), INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i), the third ground of deportation
is currently captured in the deportation ground based on inadmissibility at time of entry. 8
U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(1)(A), INA § 237(a)(1)(A). Inadmissibility, or as it was formerly
known, excludability, based on criminal conduct had been a ground for refusing entry to an
arriving non-citizen since 1891. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084, cited in Padilla
v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. -, 30 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). Section 19 also made deportable anar-
chists, prostitutes, and their procurers but pardons were unavailable to these offenders.
5 1917 Act, Sec. 19.
60 Id.
61 The JRAD, later codified INA § 241(b)(2) as 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(b)(2) (1952), was
understood to bind the agency. See, e.g., Pacheco v. I.N.S., 546 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985, 97 S. Ct. 1683, 52 L. Ed. 2d 380 (1977) (binding). It was
repealed by the Immigration Act of 1990, Nov. 29, 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-649, Title V,
§ 505(b), 104 Stat. 5050 (1990).
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when Congress repealed this section.6 2
In 1917, criminal grounds for deportation were limited to CIMTs, a term that
always has been disturbingly amorphous. This statute was written in an era
when crimes were rooted in common law malum in se tradition, long before the
advent of complex criminal statutes. In 1917, with the exception of anarchists,
prostitutes, and procurers, only crimes involving moral turpitude, understood to
be serious offenses generally, were grounds for deportation. The statute did not
then, and does not to this day contain a definition of the term, however. In the
early twentieth century, this crime category was notoriously vague, often de-
pendent on individual values and perceptions, and at that time, lacking in clear
limits or delineations. Nevertheless, in other contexts, its vagueness was not a
problem.6 3
Given the limited grounds for crime-based deportation in this early statute,
the inclusion of opportunities to exercise compassion actually was not that re-
markable. The nebulous definition of the CIMT, and the ensuing abundant
possibilities for inequity and unfairness gave rise to several trepidations voiced
in the hearings on the bill.' These concerns probably explain the inclusion of
both the pardon clause and the JRAD. The debates reveal some legislators'
uneasiness about the inconsistent boundaries for deportation based on poorly
defined criminal activity. 65 Some members of the House Committee on Immi-
gration were troubled about the disparities of crime classifications throughout
the country:
Mr. SABATH: ... [Y]ou know that a crime involving moral turpitude has
not been defined. No one can really say what is meant by saying a crime
involving moral turpitude. Under some circumstances, larceny is consid-
ered a crime involving moral turpitude-that is, stealing. We have laws in
some States under which picking out a chunk of coal on a railroad track is
considered larceny or stealing. In some States, it is considered a felony.
Some States hold that every felony is a crime involving moral turpitude.
62 Report of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H.R. 10384, 64th
Cong., Ist Sess. Immigration Act of 1990, Nov. 29, 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-649, Title V,
§ 505(b), 104 Stat. 5050 (1990).
63 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229-32 (1951) (rejecting argument that term is
void for vagueness). The BIA has stated that a CIMT "refers generally to conduct which is
inherently base, vile, or depraved and contrary to the accepted rules of morality. .. . [It is] an
act which is per se morally reprehensible or intrinsically wrong." Matter of Franklin, 20 1. &
N. Dec. 867, 868 (BIA 1994), afJ'd, 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995).
* For a discussion of the history of the CIMT in immigration, and its continuing vague-
ness today, see Mary Holper, Deportation for Sin: Why Moral Turpitude Is Void for Vague-
ness, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1936136.
65 53 CONG. Risc. 5164 (1918). There is a colorful discussion of anarchists, socialist
groups, and labor union activities that might involve the destruction of property included in
the statute as a ground of removal. Id. at 5166-68. There is a discussion of the timing of the
conviction vis-A-vis the amount of time an alien has resided in the U.S. Id. at 5168.
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In some places, the stealing of a watermelon or a chicken is larceny. In
some States, the amount is not stated. Of course, if the larceny is of an
article, or a thing which is less than $20 in value, it is a misdemeanor in
some States, but, in other States, there is no distinction.66
Rep. Sabath's worries were rebuffed by Rep. Slayden who proffered anecdo-
tal evidence that "I never knew of any man being sent to the penitentiary for
stealing chickens except one, and that man stole some thoroughbred game
birds."67 This colloquy colorfully illustrates what was on the minds of the leg-
islators and reveals the narrowness of their frame of reference at that time. For
them, most crimes carried a message of moral wrongdoing, even the most mi-
nor. Given the chicken theft example, however, it appears that the boundaries
between minor and serious offenses were very blurry in this era.
The discretionary provisos that allowed either chief executives or sentencing
judges to ameliorate the consequences of the conviction may have allayed fears
that the amorphous category of CIMT swept up too many crimes. Of the two
remedial paths, the more routine JRAD would be used more frequently than the
more exceptional pardon so the legislators paid considerable attention to defin-
ing its terms. Some members of Congress believed that any disparities and
inequities in criminal charges under the various state laws could be leveled by
judicial intervention. Others were less sanguine, dubious that this measure of-
fered sufficient protection against anti-immigrant judicial prejudice in some
parts of the country that might lead to unjust convictions of deportable offenses
and reluctance to take any steps to stop deportation. Rep. Sabath again ob-
served:
[I]n our State [Illinois] and in our city where judges are familiar with the
conditions under which these immigrants live, a judge would perhaps rec-
ommend that the man be not deported; but there are certain parts of our
country where there are judges who are prejudiced against immigrants,
who will listen to no reason or appeal and who will be only too pleased to
order deportation whenever the opportunity presents itself.68
The timing of the conviction was also a matter of concern leading to the
limitation that a first conviction must occur within five years of entry rather
66 Quoted in Jordan v. de George at 234-35, quoting from H. Comm. on Immigration and
Naturalization on H.R. 10384, 64th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (Jackson, J. dissenting). On the floor
of the House, Mr. Sabath again expressed his concern for chicken thieves:
In certain parts of the country, the larceny of a few pennies or a piece of coal or a loaf
of bread is considered a crime involving moral turpitude. I do not think we should be
too harsh on an unfortunate man of that kind.... We have cases of record where a man
has broken into a chicken coop and stolen a chicken, has been charged with the crime of
larceny or even breaking and entering, and has been sentence for a longer period than
one year.
53 CONG. REC. at 5169 (1916).
67 53 CONG. REC. at 5169 (1916).
68 Id.
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than at any indefinite time. As one House member said, "[I]f a man had come
over here without any criminal record behind him being shown, and had lived
an upright life here for 5 or 10 or 15 years, and then was convicted of a crime,
to deport him would be unjust."69 This view led to a compromise that a second
conviction, showing "a criminal heart and a criminal tendency," at any time
could lead to deportation.70 Thus, the one-time offender who resided in the
country for more than five years might escape deportation, even without a par-
don or a JRAD, but a recidivist, vulnerable to deportation at any time, needed
one of these forms of waiver to escape that fate.
Finally, although there seemed to be widespread acceptance of the JRAD as
a potentially corrective measure to assure fairness, there was considerable de-
bate about the timing of the judicial recommendation against deportation. This
led to the requirement that the judge must act no later than thirty days after
imposing sentence." The concerns expressed by the legislators about potential
abuse of this discretion by judges would seem to apply equally to the executive
authorities. Nevertheless, skepticism about the JRAD never spread to the par-
don power.
Although many aspects of the 1917 Act prompted discussion and debate, the
pardon provision received such relatively scant attention that its uncontrover-
sial inclusion seems almost casual. There is no meaningful discussion about its
inclusion or its unequivocal effect; nor are there any attempts to narrow its
scope.72 The legislators preoccupied with defining the bases for deportation
and any exceptions to that fate seemed to assume that an executive pardon
would operate as a binding bar to removal, following the well-established histo-
ry of pardons.
69 Id. at 5168.
7o Id.
71 Id. at 5169-72.
72 There is a glancing reference when a few Representatives exchange the following
opaque colloquy as part of their discussion about judicial recommendations at sentencing:
Mr. Mann: Suppose a man should be pardoned?
Mr. Howard: Well, I have known of men who were pardoned that ought not to have
been pardoned.
Mr. Mann: I understand and I have no doubt the gentleman has known governors to
pardon men who ought to be pardoned.
Mr. Howard: The mere fact that they are pardoned does not make them morally fit.
Mr. Mann: There are a great many people convicted of a great many crimes unjustly,
sometimes where the circumstances were not fully known.
Mr. Hayes: [T]he judge still has the right to recommend executive pardon for the con-
vict, . . . and a part of that pardon will, under the law, prevent the deportation.
Id. at 5170.
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B. The Acts of 1924, 1925, and 1926
The pardon power survived unquestioned in successive bills even when Con-
gress either sought to modify or actually did modify the grounds of deportation.
All subsequent proposed bills retained the pardon as an exemption for someone
convicted of a CIMT. A 1925 proposed amendment to the 1917 Act which
died in Congress 73 left undisturbed the pardon power to exempt CIMT offend-
ers from deportation.74 Another bill in 1926 responded to the growing belief
that immigrants were responsible for serious crime, were anti-govemment, and
were avoiding deportation. This bill tried to extend deportation grounds to
include any crime committed at any time. A representative named Jenkins,
speaking in favor of the bill, stated that public sentiment demands this house
cleaning. "The fountain of patriotism and Americanism should not be fouled
with a mixture of anarchy, communism and lawlessness. . . . The alien black
hand and gunman has no place in American life. No time should be wasted on
his extermination." 76 To summarize his absolutist position, the legislation
mandating deportation for all crimes caused no injustice; indeed justice was
served when deportation is both strict and certain.
Despite this high-flying law-and-order, anti-immigrant rhetoric, and an effort
to eliminate the JRAD,7 7 this bill made no attempt to rescind the pardon exemp-
tion for any CIMT. Notwithstanding the many large and small, proposed and
enacted amendments and modifications to the immigration laws throughout the
first half of the twentieth century, the pardon power survived untouched.
C. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
During the first half of the twentieth century, the grounds of deportation had
expanded somewhat haphazardly. The 1952 comprehensive Immigration and
Nationality Act codified in a single section eighteen classes of deportable
aliens.8 The basic criminal grounds of deportation, found in Section 241 of the
1 66 CONG. REC. 3271 (1925).
74 Id.
11 Deportation Act of 1926, H.R. 11489; see 67 CONG. REC. 10858 (June 7, 1926).
76 67 CONG. REC. 10873 (1926).
7 H.R. Rep. No. 69-991, at 5-6 (1926).
78 H.R. 11489 at 6, 69th Cong. 1st Sess., Apr. 26, 1926. This version of the statute did
not limit the pardon to CIMTs specifically but the statute also permitted deportation upon
conviction for any offense, however minor and not necessarily involving moral turpitude.
This expansion of the grounds of deportation was objected to in the minority report. H.R.
Rep. No. 69-991, Part 2, at 5-6 (1926).
7 For more information about the early history of the pardon clause see Jason Cade,
Deporting the Pardoned, 46 U.C. DAVIS L.R. 355, 369-71 (2012).
s0 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (1952) [herein-
after "the 1952 Act"]. In addition to criminal convictions for CIMTs, these grounds includ-
ed deportation of individuals who would have been excludable at the time of entry, who
failed to comply with alien registration requirements, anarchists, members of the Communist
2013] 311
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL
1952 Act, largely preserved the terms of the 1917 Act, and then captured
crimes that had been added sporadically during the intervening years."' Consis-
tent with past laws, any non-citizen convicted of a CIMT within five years of
entry, sentenced to more than a year of imprisonment, or convicted of two
CIMTs arising out of more than one course of conduct, whether or not incarcer-
ated, was deportable.82 The statute again exempted from deportation anyone
convicted of a CIMT who had been granted a pardon from either the President
or a governor, but now the language required the pardon to be "full and uncon-
ditional." A judicial recommendation against deportation made at the time of
sentencing or no more than thirty days thereafter remained another option for
avoiding removal.
The pardon clause, as well the JRAD provision, slipped easily into the new
immigration act. Judging from the matter-of-fact treatment of this provision by
resources written shortly after the passage of the statute, it seems clear that the
ability of a pardon to prevent removal was accepted and unquestioned, even if
not frequently used. For example, in one contemporary treatise, the author
states, "A pardon reaches both the punishment and guilt. When the pardon is
full, the offender becomes innocent of the crime charged and from a legal view-
point he is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense."' In another,
the pardon power is characterized as an act of discretion to avert deportation.85
In the 1952 Act, the pardon clause made no distinctions between the differ-
ent offenses within the scope of the general criminal deportation grounds. This
changed in 1956 when a single sentence was added to preclude its application
to specified narcotics violations.86 For the next forty-plus years, the pardon
clause extended potential relief to any non-citizen for any crime-based deporta-
tion other than a narcotics offense.87
Party of the United States or other totalitarian parties, persons who have become public
charges within five years of entry, narcotics addicts or traffickers, brothel managers, and
persons convicted of possession of automatic weapons or sawed-off shotguns.
8 For example, in addition to CIMTs, over the years convictions for a narcotics violation,
46 Stat. 1171, 8 U.S.C. § 156(a) (1931), and weapons possession and violations of the Alien
Registration Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) had been added as grounds for deportation.
See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (1952).
82 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(4); INA § 242(a)(4).
83 INA § 242(b).
' SIDNEY KANSAS, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY AcT ANNOTATED 133 (1953).
85 REUBEN OPPENHEIMER, THE ADMINISTRATION OIF THE DEPORTATION LAW 01 THE UNIT-
ED STATES 37 (1931). See also William Fliegelman, Deportation, in Proceedings of the
New York University Conference on PRACTICE AND) PROCEDURE UNDER THE IMMIGRATION
AND NATIONALITY Acr 49, June 13, 1953 (Harry Sellin, ed., 1954).
86 Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, Title 11, § 301, Stat. 567, 575
(1956).
87 The inability of a pardon to prevent deportation in the case of a narcotics crime contin-
ues today, although, ironically, a conviction for a controlled substance crime not charged as
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D. Modern Immigration and Nationality Laws
The outlook today is bleak for non-citizens convicted of crimes. The types
and categories of crimes that constitute grounds of removal have multiplied,
while many discretionary forms of relief, including JRADs, have been eliminat-
ed or severely curtailed so that few options to avoid deportation are unavailable
to so-called "criminal aliens." 8 8 Immigration laws now deal harshly and relent-
lessly with individuals convicted of an enormous array of crimes regardless of
when they were committed, the status of the immigrant, the length of lawful
residence, or the personal circumstances of the individual surrounding or fol-
lowing the conviction.
Between 1988 and 1996, four federal statutes greatly expanded the types and
grounds of deportable crimes. First, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 intro-
duced the new concept of a conviction for an "aggravated felony" that was
added to the list of deportable offenses.89 The Immigration Act of 1990 reorga-
nized the grounds for deportation and revised the criminal grounds of deporta-
tion by expanding the aggravated felony categories, and, while retaining the
basic CIMT definition, extended the definition to state as well as federal
crimes.9 o The Immigration and Technical Corrections Act of 1994 added even
more crimes.9' The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
further lengthened the list.92 Finally, the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 amended, revised and expanded the term as well as
applied the definition to convictions regardless of when they occurred.93
Throughout this time of legislative activity, the pardon clause remained safe-
ly tucked away. 94 Now denominated a waiver of deportation, a pardon applies
an aggravated felony would not bar Cancellation of Removal. See, e.g., Lopez v. Gonzales,
549 U.S. 47, 127 S. Ct. 625 (2006).
8 Particular deportable crimes are enumerated in INA § 237(a)(2) and must be cross-
referenced to the definition of "aggravated felony" found in INA § 101(a)(43), a category
which expanded dramatically in the 1990s.
89 Pub. L. No 100-690, Title VII, subtitle J, § 7344, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-70 (1988), INA
§ 241(a)(4)(B). "Aggravated felony" was defined to include the most serious of crimes:
"murder, any drug trafficking crime as defined in section 924(c) of title 18, United States
Code, or any illicit trafficking in any firearms or destructive devices as defined in section
921 of such title, or any attempt or conspiracy to commit any such act, committed within the
United States."
90 Pub. L. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (1990) added offenses to the list, extend-
ed the definition to state as well as federal crimes, and restricted both procedural rights and
forms of relief. For a comprehensive legislative history, see Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught
in Congressional Fishnets-Immigration Law's New Aggravated Felons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 589, 592-605 (1997-1998).
9' Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4311 (1994).
92 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1270 (1996).
93 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-558 (1996).
94 The statute was slightly revised and renumbered twice, first in 1990-from INA
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to: (1) a single CIMT conviction within five years of entry for which a sentence
of a year or more in prison was imposed, (2) multiple CIMT convictions re-
gardless of sentence, (3) aggravated felonies, and (4) high-speed flight from
immigration authorities. Although it does not extend to all criminal grounds of
removal such as weapons or domestic violence offenses, the provision is un-
changed as it applies to CIMTs and aggravated felonies, the two largest catego-
ries of deportable offenses. Its continued availability to aggravated felons,
however, is quite remarkable considering how many crimes this category now
includes and that an aggravated felony conviction bars almost every other form
of relief under the statute. 95
Immigration laws have been remarkably consistent over the past century in
creating and expanding categories of undesirable foreign nationals and have
been especially unwelcoming to individuals who commit crimes. Yet these
laws also contained considerable mechanisms for exercising compassion and
mercy. As Justice Stevens discussed at length in Padilla v. Kentucky, for many
years, the JRAD permitted sentencing judges to take advantage of their unique
perspective presiding over the prosecution of the criminal matter, including an
individualized sentence that could take into account the consequences of depor-
tation in relation both to the facts of the crime and the non-citizen defendant.9 6
To the regret of many, the JRAD has disappeared and, despite calls for its
reinstatement, it does not seem a likely candidate for resurrection. 97 With the
JRAD's elimination, only the pardon remains as an avenue of relief that can be
effectuated outside of, but with a direct impact on, immigration proceedings.
E. The Pardon Clause Today
Before 1990, no doubt the JRAD offered a much simpler and more direct
route to relief that avoided the practical and political hurdles involved in secur-
ing relief at the highest executive levels. But, unlike its JRAD companion, the
pardon clause survived and even enlarged since now the full range of aggravat-
§ 241(b) to INA § 241 (a)(2)(A)(iv), then again in 1996 to its current iteration in INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(vi),
95 Cancellation of Removal, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b, INA §240A; Voluntary Departure, 8
U.S.C.A. § 1229c, INA § 240B; and Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1158, INA § 208 and 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(3), INA 241(b)(3) are all forms of relief barred
by an aggravated felony conviction.
96 Padilla, 559 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1479-80.
9 Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge,
51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1174 (2002) (arguing for a restoration of the JRAD); see also ABA
Crim. Just. Sect. Comm. of Immig., Report to the House of Delegates-Recommendation
(urging, inter alia, the reinstatement of some form of JRAD), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublishing/criminal-justice-sectionnewsletter/crimjust
policy-my06300.authcheckdam.pdf. The JRAD survives only in cases where the recom-
mendation was made at a sentencing prior to its repeal. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Chertoff, 501
F.3d 107, 116 (2d Cir. 2007).
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ed felonies is covered. 98 It is difficult to assess how frequently a pardon actual-
ly secures relief because instances where a pardon has successfully averted de-
portation are unlikely to result in reported decisions. But the section sits
quietly in the statute inviting the brave chief executive to take advantage of its
potential in deserving and appropriate circumstances.
The requirements of the pardon clause in INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(vi) are gener-
ally clear, but also are qualified so that a pardon's protection is neither absolute
nor guaranteed. There are only a handful of cases in which the applicability of
a pardon to deportability is raised in either Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIA") or federal court cases. The next section will review the uses and limi-
tations of the pardon clause in the context of immigration law. In the small
body of case law concerning the effect of pardons, both agency and court inter-
pretation of the statute have been literal and strict as the following summary
reveals.99
1. The Pardon Only Affects the Grounds of Removability Set Forth in
the Statute.
Although terms like CIMT and aggravated felony include many crimes, con-
victions for other deportable offenses such as crimes of domestic violence,'0
controlled substance offenses,' 0 1 and firearms offenses are not covered by the
pardon clause. Thus, while a pardon might help a person convicted of sexual
abuse deportable as an aggravated felon, it would not bar deportation if the
conviction were for a domestic violence offense.102
2. The Pardon Must Be Granted by the Executive Authority.
A pardon must be issued by a constitutionally authorized executive. For ex-
ample, since 1777, the governor of New York has had continuous authority to
issue pardons.' 3 In the past, some states provided for "legislative" pardons
when certain conditions had been fulfilled such as the completion of a sen-
tence." But following 1952, those pardons were not given effect to thwart
deportation. 0 5 Nor are pardons automatically awarded as a matter of law with-
98 INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(vi).
99 A more comprehensive description of the jurisprudence of immigration pardons can be
found at Samuel T. Morison, Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law, 6 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 253, 262-68 (2010).
'0 In re Suh, 23 I. & N. Dec. 626 (BIA 2003) (unconditional pardon does not waive
removability).
'o' Matter of Moeller, Int. Dec. 2543 (BIA 1976); Kwai Chiu Yuen v. I.N.S., 406 F.2d
499 (9th Cir. 1969).
102 Matter of Suh, 23 1. & N. Dec. 626 (BIA 2003).
103 N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 4. See infra pp. 318-20.
1' U.S. ex rel. Malesevic v. Perkins, 17 F. Supp. 851 (W.D. Pa. 1936) (giving effect to
legislative pardon).
105 See, e.g., Matter of R-, 5 1. & N. Dec. 612 (1954).
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out action by the executive sufficient to bar deportation.' 6 If a state's constitu-
tion permits delegation of the pardon authority to a board or commission, that is
considered the equivalent of an executive pardon.' 07
3. The Pardon Must Be "Full"' 0 8 and Unconditional. 1
To be effective, a pardon must be absolute and unqualified. Clemency, the
reduction of a sentence, a form of lesser executive relief often sought in con-
junction with a pardon, is insufficient to invoke the pardon clause waiver.
4. A Foreign Pardon Is Ineffective to Forestall Deportation.
Both the courts and the agency have denied relief to individuals pardoned by
authorities outside of the United States. The structure of the pardon clause
refers to convictions subsequent to admission so that pardons obtained prior to
coming to the United States would be inadequate."o Difficulties in understand-
ing the operations of foreign legal systems and the meaning of foreign pardons,
as well as in obtaining reliable information from other countries are the usual
justifications for this limitation."'
5. A Pardon May Not Provide Relief for Inadmissibility-Most of the
Time.
The INA's pardon clause is drafted as a form of relief for deportation. The
current trend is, therefore, to refuse to give a pardon any effect on the question
of inadmissibility. Several recent decisions have restricted the effect of a par-
don to deny relief in cases where the individual was seeking admission, relying
on a strict reading of the statute." 2 The Ninth Circuit provided the most recent,
106 Matter of Nolan, Int. Dec. 3043 (BIA 1988) (automatic first offender pardon is not
sufficient).
107 Matter of Tajer, 15 1. & N. Dec. 125 (BIA 1974); Matter of D-, 7 1. & N. Dec. 476
(BIA 1957); see also Taran v. U.S., 266 F.2d 561, 567 (8th Cir. 1959) (pardon authority
constitutionally delegated to Board of Pardons); In re Grant, A038 203 942 (Immig. Ct.
Atlanta 2010) (unpublished BIA decision remanding to determine whether Georgia constitu-
tion provided pardon power to be exercised by Board of Pardons and Parole so that pardon is
equivalent to gubernatorial pardon).
"'s Matter of Nolan, 19 1. & N. Dec. 539 (BIA 1988).
'0 Matter of C-, 5 1. & N. Dec. 630 (BIA 1954) (a pardon that depends on the comple-
tion of a sentence does not qualify).
"o U.S. ex rel. Palermo v. Smith, 17 F.2d 534, 535 (2d Cir. 1927); Weedin v. Hempel, 28
F.2d 603, 604 (9th Cir. 1928); Mercer v. Lence, 96 F.2d 122, 125 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
305 U.S. 611, 83 L. Ed. 388, 59 S. Ct. 69 (1938); Matter of G-, 5 1. & N. Dec. 1295 (BIA
1953); Matter of B-, 7 1. & N. Dec. 166, 169 (BIA 1956); Matter of F-Y-G-, 4 1. & N. Dec.
717 (BIA 1952); Kent v. I.N.S., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 13115 (10th Cir. 1994).
''' U.S. ex rel. Palermo v. Smith, 17 F.2d 534, 535 (2d Cir. 1927); Matter of G-, 5 1. &
N. Dec. 129 (BIA 1953).
112 See, e.g., Balogun v. United States AG, 425 F.3d 1356, 1363 (1lth Cir. 2005);
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and most thorough, discussion of this issue. In Aquilera-Montero v. Mukasey,
the respondent was placed into removal proceedings on grounds of inadmissi-
bility after his application to adjust status was denied due to a disqualifying
criminal conviction for a controlled substance offense despite his gubernatorial
pardon." 3 The court rejected an equal protection claim brought by the respon-
dent that alleged an impermissible distinction between inadmissibility and de-
portability based on the same conviction." 4
Confusingly, the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual takes a differ-
ent view in the context of a visa application."' The Manual cites a seemingly
inapposite 1954 Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") case, Matter of H-,
which held that the pardon provision includes not only a person who is deport-
able under the designated crimes in INA § 237(a)(2) but also someone who is
deportable under INA § 237(a)(1) as having been improperly admitted due to a
preexisting (pardoned) crime committed in the U.S. prior to a departure and the
application for a visa for a new admission." 6
6. A Pardon Does Not Eradicate the Impact of a Conviction on a Good
Moral Character Determination.
A criminal conviction also affects other applications for relief. A pardon has
no automatic or guaranteed impact on the assessment of good moral character,
a requirement for naturalization, even if it meets all of the criteria for a waiver
of deportation."' 7 As long ago as 1878, a man convicted of perjury and sen-
Brailsford v. Holder, 374 Fed. Appx. 738 (9th Cir. 2010); Irabar v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 219 Fed.
Appx. 964 (11th Cir. 2007); Jimenez-Ariza v. Holder, 457 Fed. Appx. 607, 608, 2011 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22281 (9th Cir. 2011); Brailsford v. Holder, 374 Fed. Appx. 738 (9th Cir.
2010).
" Aquilera-Montero v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2008). He was charged with
inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(1I).
114 Id., at 1252-53. The court justified its holding on another basis rooted in the statute:
the pardon clause does not benefit individuals convicted of controlled substance offenses and
such convictions render someone both deportable and inadmissible. See also Yuen v. INS,
406 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1969).
1's Effect of pardon by appropriate U.S. authorities/foreign states: An alien shall not be
considered ineligible under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) [for a visa] by reason of a conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude for which a full and unconditional pardon has been granted
by the President of the United States, by the Governor of a State of the United States, by the
former High Commissioner for Germany acting pursuant to Executive Order 10062, or by
the United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany acting pursuant to Execu-
tive Order 10608. 22 C.F.R. § 40.21(a)(5) (2012).
116 Matter of H-, 6 1. & N. Dec. 90 (BIA 1954) (full and unconditional pardon removes
inadmissibility); Matter of K-, 9 1. & N. Dec. 121 (BIA 1960); 9 1. & N. Dec. 121 (relying
on Matter of H-, JRAD removes inadmissibility).
117 While any criminal conviction might be taken into account in the assessment, only a
conviction for an aggravated felony or multiple gambling offenses operates as an automatic
bar to good moral character. INA § 101(f). See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 231 F.2d 856,
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tenced to prison who was pardoned by the governor of Oregon was denied
naturalization because, while the pardon relieved him of ensuing disabilities, it
did not eliminate the fact of his conviction."' In the same vein, in modem
times, while affirming the denial of a naturalization application, a federal court
explained why a pardon has no automatic preclusive effect on the question of
good moral character:
[Als the very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of penalty, a
pardon implies guilt; it does not obliterate the fact of the commission of
the crime and the conviction thereof; it does not wash out the moral stain;
as has been tersely said; it involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness." 9
III. GOVERNOR PATERSON'S PARDON PANEL AS A MODEL
FOR STATE ACTION
Governor Paterson felicitously, if too fleetingly, married the INA to the pow-
er to pardon that has existed under New York State law since before indepen-
dence. State pardoning authority typically rests in state constitutional law. All
states have some form of clemency process but often the executive acts in con-
junction with other officials such as pardon boards with whom the power is
either delegated or shared. 20
A. The Pardon Power Under New York State Law
The pardon power in New York State, granted originally to the Governor of
New York in 1771 by King George III, reflected the royal policy in effect at
that time to be followed by the government of the colony.' 2 ' This practice
continued after the Revolution and was incorporated into the first Constitution
of New York State in 1777, vesting power in the governor to grant pardons. 122
859-60 (5th Cir. 1956) (unnecessary to determine how pardon of murder conviction would
operate in good character determination since pardon was granted within five-year period
prior to naturalization application).
"I In re Spenser, 22 F. Cas. 921, 923; 1878 U.S. App. LEXIS 1987 (Cir. Ct. D. Or.
1878).
"9 In re Petition for Naturalization of Quintana, 203 F. Supp. 376, 377 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
120 See generally MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF IROM THE COLLATERAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE (2006); Kobil,
supra note 28, at 605; Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the
Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REv. 1333, 1350 (2008); John Dinan, The Pardon Power
and the American State Constitutional Tradition, 35 Poury 389, 393 (April 2003). The
U.S. Constitution does not require states to have a clemency system, Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 414 (1993), but all states do.
121 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 695-96 (1906).
122 The governor was given the power to grant reprieves and pardons to persons convict-
ed of crimes other than treason or murder, in which he may suspend the execution of the
sentence until it shall be reported to the Legislature, at their subsequent meeting, and they
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The earliest provision excluded treason, and a pardon for a murder conviction
had to be confirmed by the legislature.
In subsequent versions of the New York constitution, the pardon power re-
mained in force, essentially unchanged notwithstanding recurrent efforts to
move it from the governor to some kind of pardon board or even court.'23 The
pardon power was reconsidered at every subsequent constitutional convention,
but no changes resulted. For example, in 1846, the following were among the
proposals that were rejected: restrictions on the pardon power in cases of mur-
der by giving the State Senate the ultimate say; a requirement that notice of
intent to pardon be sent to the judge who tried the case or the district attorney; a
condition that notices of applications for pardons be published in advance of a
hearing in order to give interested parties a chance to voice their views.124 At
the 1867 Constitutional Convention, the Committee on Governor and Other
State Officers once again spurned the idea of a pardon board, in large part
because "appeals to mercy" might be prevented if the board imposed judicial-
like formalities. Mercy as a basis for pardoning also influenced the rejection of
a proposition that the governor provide an explanation for the decision to par-
don. One committee member noted that "the pardoning power was based on
mercy, not on justice; justice can always assign reasons, but mercy cannot."125
At the Constitutional Convention of 1894, more substantial efforts to change
the structure of the pardon power were proposed. Several proposals would
have shifted the pardon power to a Court of Pardons or a pardoning board, both
of which would include judicial members in addition to the governor.126 The
defeat of these amendments again left the exclusive executive power un-
changed. After the last Constitutional Convention in 1967, along with informa-
tion explaining how the pardon system works, the pros and cons of this power
were set forth in a guide to voters in 1967:
Those in favor of the retention of the Governor's present authority argue
that this power is necessary to serve as a check on "mechanical jurispru-
dence" that might work harsh results in an individual case. They further
argue that the Governor has exercised the power fairly, that the system
works well and, as a result this traditional power of the Governor should
be retained.
shall either pardon or direct the execution of the criminal, or grant a further reprieve. N.Y.
CONST. art. XVIII, § 18 (1777).
123 N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1821); N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (1846); N.Y. CONST. art.
IV, § 5 (1894); N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (1938); N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (1967). At various
times, several proposals to amend the pardon power largely concerned with procedures sur-
rounding pardons for murder were under consideration but none were enacted.
124 LINCOLN, supra note 121, at 135-36.
125 N.Y. State Constitutional Convention Committee: Problems Relating to Executive
Administration and Powers 51 (1938), excerpting Debates 1867, Vol. 11. 1207-08.
126 LINCOLN, supra note 121, at 310-11.
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Those opposed to the retention of his power argue that it is unnecessary
since parole and certification of good conduct from parole boards accom-
plish the same ends. They further argue that the power could be abused,
and that it would be better to put the pardoning power in the parole board
which are more familiar with individual cases than is the Governor.1 27
The separate reference to treason, a grave concern at the founding of the
country, was eliminated at the last Constitutional Convention.128 Aside from
that, today's version of the pardon power closely resembles the original enacted
in 1777.129
B. The Paterson Panel's Pardons
In 2010, Governor Paterson made headlines when he created the New York
State Immigration Pardon Board.130 This initiative was prompted directly by
Qing Hong Wu's compelling story, a narrative that epitomizes the predicament
many immigrants face when, despite long ago convictions and long productive
lives in the United States, they find themselves on the brink of removal without
any possibility of relief.13' Even before the Pardon Board became operational,
Governor Paterson pardoned Wu,' 32 who shortly thereafter naturalized.' 3 3
This bold step seized upon a remedy against deportation provided by Con-
gress in the INA that confers upon state executives, as well as the President, the
power to assist individuals facing deportation based on criminal convictions.'34
127 N.Y.S. Temporary Commission on the Constitutional Convention 117-19 (1967).
128 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, A NE-w YORK CONSTITUTION MEETING TODAY'S NiEEDS AND
TomORROW'S CHALLENGES 93 (1967). Apparently, the proviso against pardons for treason
was superfluous since there had never been any convictions for treason in almost 200 years.
129 N.Y. CONST.. art. IV, § 4; see also N.Y. Exiec. LAW § 15.
130 Danny Hakim & Nina Bernstein, New Paterson Policy May Reduce Deportations,
N.Y. TIMis, May 4, 2010, at Al; Press Release, Gov. Paterson Creates a Panel to Review
Cases of Legal Immigrants Facing Deportation, May 4, 2010, available at http://www.
governor.ny.gov/archive/paterson/press/0503 I ODeportation.html.
131 Most forms of relief are barred to aliens with aggravated felony convictions, see supra
note 95. A criminal conviction also factors into a determination of admissibility, INA
§ 212(a)(2) and "good moral character," INA § 101(f), which is a prerequisite for many
forms of discretionary relief such as Cancellation of Removal, INA § 240A(b), and naturali-
zation, INA § 316(d).
132 Nina Bernstein, Paterson Rewards Redemption With a Pardon, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 6,
2010, at A20.
3 Nina Bernstein, After Governor's Pardon, an Immigrant Is Sworn in as a Citizen,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 29, 2010, at A20.
" INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(vi) exempts from removal non-citizens "granted a full and uncon-
ditional pardon by the President of the United States or by the Governor of any of the several
States" following a conviction for crimes of moral turpitude, aggravated felonies (see INA
§ 101(a)(43)), and high speed flight from immigration checkpoints (see 18 U.S.C.A. § 758).
Other crimes are not eligible for this waiver including controlled substance, firearms, and
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Governor Paterson's motivation for this program was no secret. On Christmas
Eve, 2010, when Paterson announced the pardons of additional New Yorkers,
he proclaimed:
That our Federal government does not credit rehabilitation, nor account
for human suffering, is antithetical to the ideals this country represents.
With these pardons, I have selected cases that exemplify the values of
New York State and any civilized society: atonement, forgiveness, com-
passion, and the need to achieve justice, and not simply strict adherence to
unjust statutes. I will not turn my back on New Yorkers who enrich our
lives and care for those who suffer.' 35
Before he left office, Governor Paterson favorably acted on a record number
of applications, allowing individuals to either avoid deportation altogether or to
be in a more advantageous position to apply for relief in immigration court
removal proceedings. By late 2010, in the waning days of his administration,
he had pardoned 33 people, a notable number, but only a small fraction of the
more than 1,000 applicants.1 36
Reactions to Paterson's humanitarian venture generally were favorable, but
as might be expected, it was not universally praised.'13  This program was
short-lived, however. After Paterson's term as Governor ended in 2010, his
successor Governor Andrew Cuomo discontinued the pardon panel.' 38 The
domestic violence offenses. See, e.g., In re Jung Tae Suh, I. & N. Dec. 626 (BIA 2003)
(pardon does not eliminate removability after domestic violence conviction).
13 Governor Paterson Announces Pardons, STATES NEWS SERVICES, Dec. 24, 2010,
available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/archive/paterson/press/122410-GovPaterson
AnnouncesPardons.html.
136 Kirk Semple, Governor Pardons Six Immigrants Facing Deportation Over Old
Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010, at A25. At the end of this article, there is a table of these
pardons that singles out the date and nature of the convictions pardoned. This information
was extrapolated from press releases at the time. Unfortunately, not all cases were reported
consistently. Some state the age at the time of arrival in the U.S., some set forth family
circumstances, and some describe the accomplishments of the individual. What is readily
apparent from a perusal of the common facts that are available is that most of the convictions
were quite old, for minor crimes, and were the only crimes committed by the person
pardoned. Despite the staleness of the misconduct and the relative insignificance of the
offenses, the DHS was seeking to deport, and in some instances was detaining, these individ-
uals.
' Compare A Reminder About American Values, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2010, at A30
(commending the Governor for showing "courage and common sense at a time when the
national debate about immigration shows little of either") with OKAY, He Means Well, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, May 6, 2010, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/means=
paterson=pardon=state=scheme=immigrants=full=holes=article=1.444859/ (calling the panel
plan "well-intentioned [but] half-baked").
138 The New York City Council passed a resolution "calling on New York State Gover-
nor Andrew Cuomo to continue and expand the Immigrant Pardon Panel to ensure that legal
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New York State executive pardon apparatus has reverted to its former structure
and its usual practice of granting negligible numbers of pardons.139
Governor Paterson was not the first state executive to utilize the pardon au-
thority to subvert the harsh effects of immigration laws, 40 but his project was
the most ambitious and had the greatest potential for becoming permanent. But
any hope that his audacious undertaking might serve as a model for an expand-
ed use of the state pardon to alleviate the harshness of immigration law has
evaporated. Not only did the New York special pardon board disappear in
2011 with the election of a new governor, but no other state's governor has
followed Paterson's lead in creating a specific pardon route for non-citizens
facing removal.
Neither the President nor governors dispense unconditional pardons extrava-
gantly. Since 1900, from the administrations of Presidents McKinley to
Obama, the President has granted pardons to 14,288 people.' 4 ' Of that number,
permanent residents who paid their debts to, and are now productive members of, society can
continue to contribute to our great State." New York, N.Y., Res. No. 548-A (Mar. 23, 2011).
" Pardons in New York State are issued through the Governor's Counsel's Office and
the Executive Clemency Committee, which recommend cases to the Governor for the exer-
cise of his pardon power. See https://www.parole.state.ny.us/clemency.html. Past governors
had exercised this power quite sparingly. Anahad O'Connor, Spitzer Pardons Ex-Convict to
Spare Him Deportation, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 22, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/12/22/nyregion/22pardon.html; Jim Dwyer, Contemplating Official Mercy: No Small
Task, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2011, at AI8; see also N.Y. State Defenders Ass'n, New York
Clemency, Decisions (1995-2010), available at http://www.nysda.org/Clemency.html. On
the eve of the end of his first year in office, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo had not
pardoned anyone. GovERNoR's JOURNAL, Daugaard, Cuomo Pardons, Dec. 31, 2011; The
Power to Pardon Remains Unused, TIMES UNION, Dec. 29, 2011, available at http://
www.timesunion.comlocal/article/power-to=pardon=remains=unused=2431920.php.
140 In response to the broadening of the range and retroactivity of deportable crimes fol-
lowing the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act [IIRAIRA],
Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996), the Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole grant-
ed 138 pardons to Georgia residents specifically to thwart their removal. This effort was
limited to misdemeanants but was implemented on a "class-wide" basis. Elizabeth Rapaport,
The Georgia Immigration Pardons: A Case Study in Mass Clemency, 13 FED'L SENT. REP.
184 (2000-2001). There are some scattered accounts of "immigration" pardons in Oregon,
Maryland, and Virginia prior to a 2008 ABA report. ABA Crim. Just. Sect. Comm. of
Immig., Report to the House of Delegates-Recommendation (urging, inter alia, the reinstate-
ment of some form of JRAD), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publishing/criminal justice sectionnewsletter/crimjust-policy-my06300.authcheckdam.pdf
(urging, inter alia, the reinstatement of some form of JRAD).
141 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE PARDON ArrORNEY, http://www.justice.gov/
pardon/statistics.htm, (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). A fairly recent survey of the use of par-
dons reported that "pardons have become relatively rare in most U.S. jurisdictions, including
many in which pardon provides the only way to avoid or mitigate the collateral conse-
quences of conviction." LOVE, supra note 120, at 37. Sources for state pardon statistics are
less organized, but those available paint a similar picture of relatively small numbers. See,
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most pardons were granted to individuals who were not facing removal. So,
despite almost a century of the INA pardon clause, its actual impact on other-
wise removable non-citizens is not substantial. Notwithstanding the potential
of the pardon power to affect positively the lives of individuals facing removal,
there are very few court cases addressing the scope, limits, and applicability of
the pardon power in the immigration context. Those that do exist usually limit
rather than expand the application of this authority. 14 2 There is also meager
scholarship on the subject.14 3 Nor has there been any noticeable public debate
specifically concerning the provocative issues inherent in the pardon clause: the
ability of both federal and state chief executives to use their statutory authority
to inhibit federal immigration authority,'" and how the philosophical underpin-
nings of the executive pardon interact with the increasingly unforgiving, inflex-
ible, and harsh deportation scheme.145
By expanding the option already afforded to governors to exercise their un-
questioned discretion, some of the harsh effects of immigration statutes on state
residents and their families might be ameliorated. Not using the pardon power
to redress the extreme hardship or inequities in some cases of deportation is a
squandered opportunity. There are no numerical limitations imposed by the
statute, nor is there federal oversight or permissible second-guessing by immi-
gration authorities. Nothing prevents state executives from taking advantage of
the authority granted by the INA for more than a century. There are easy-to-
imagine prerequisites and constraints that governors could develop to properly
regulate pardon grants to avoid overuse or abuse. 4 6
e.g., OLR Research Report, Pardon Statistics from Other States, Jan. 14, 2005, available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005-R-0065.htm.
142 See discussion and notes supra Section III.E.
143 In an excellent, comprehensive article, Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law,
supra note 48, Samuel T. Morrison, a former attorney in the Office of the Pardon Attorney,
U.S. Dep't. of Justice, reviews the history of the pardon power and criticizes the limitations
imposed by the INA. He does not focus on gubernatorial pardons but concludes that their
use should be expanded and surmises that, "The paucity of gubernatorial pardons in recent
years suggests that they will be reserved for petitioners on whose behalf local community
sentiment strongly favors a waiver of deportation, precisely those most likely to be attractive
candidates for relief, as Congress presumably intended." Id. at 342. See also Nora
Demleiter, Using the Pardon Power to Prevent Deportation: Legitimate, Desirable or
Neither in a Federal System, 12 Loy. J. PunL. INT. L. 365, 372 (2010-2011) ("It is a respon-
sible way of dispensing executive mercy clearly permitted statutorily and under the state's
constitution.").
' See, e.g., Cade, supra note 79 arguing "[T]here is insufficient clarity that Congress
intended to limit the effect of pardons to remove the immigration consequences of state
convictions."
145 See, e.g., Demleiter, supra note 143.
146 The ABA Criminal Justice Section, Commission on Immigration recently adopted a
report that urges the expansion of the pardon power to provide relief to otherwise removable
non-citizen "where the circumstances of the particular case warrant it" and to develop acces-
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Moreover, none of the problems of unconstitutional preemption that plague
efforts by state legislatures to control immigration should obstruct this effort
since Congress already has permitted the pardon to function as a defense to
deportation. A governor can rely on existing legislation without fear of intrud-
ing on federal immigration authority since Congress itself provided this option
specifically to ameliorate the immigration consequences of a conviction. Now
that the INA itself no longer recognizes waivers that reward rehabilitation, or
express mercy or forgiveness, a pardon designed with standards and safeguards
can provide a substitute remedy to be exercised in appropriate situations. In
addition to the practical solution for deserving situations provided by the par-
don, it allows immigration law to realign more rationally with the theories of
criminal law based on mercy, forgiveness, and rehabilitation from which it has
been drifting in recent years.
IV. CREATING A RATIONAL, TRANSPARENT SYSTEM OF GUBERNATORIAL
PARDONS OF IMMIGRANTS FACING REMOVAL
Most accounts of presidential pardons tell a story of the declining use of this
singular power.' 47 Few state chief executives grant pardons either, 48 although
a few governors have occasionally been more forceful and even courageous in
granting other forms of clemency, particularly in death penalty cases.' 49 Since
one of the principal purposes of a pardon is to ameliorate the indirect penalties
of a conviction particularly after an individual has completed a sentence, par-
dons are possibly becoming redundant with the growth of other state law mea-
sures that alleviate the civil disabilities or collateral consequences of convic-
tions. 1o Governors who have exercised clemency, usually with sentence
commutations rather than full pardons, are motivated by diverse "mercy" fac-
tors such as the age of the recipient (at either extreme), a reaction to a particular





147 "There is little doubt that in recent decades, there has been an atrophy of the clemency
power at the state and federal levels." Daniel T. Kobil, Forgiveness and the Law: Executive
Clemency and the American System of Justice: How to Grant Clemency in Unforgiving
Times, 31 CAP. U.L. Ruv. 219, 223 (2003).
148 LovE, supra note 120, at 19-20.
1 Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 FE.
SENT. REP. 153, 153-54 (2009) (describing examples of gubernatorial pardons in Arkansas,
Maryland, Virginia, Colorado, and Iowa).
150 See generally LovE, supra note 120. New York law restores the right to vote to
felons who have been pardoned or who have completed their sentences. Following a suc-
cessful application, a Certificate of Relief from Disabilities, N.Y. Correct. Law §§ 700-705,
can restore a range of rights lost upon conviction but obviously cannot prevent deportation.
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sentence, or a sense of moral responsibility.'"' Occasionally, a governor might
consider a "public interest" clemency such as a sentence commutation that
could help ease prison overcrowding or send a message to the legislature about
reconsidering excessively harsh sentences.152
In this era of clemency scarcity, Governor Paterson's decisive and coura-
geous program was all the more remarkable. While it is true that he was at the
end of his term of office so that any political fallout would be inconsequential
to his career, he acted quickly and decisively to create and implement his
plan.' Pardon stories usually promote themes of justice and mercy, public
benefit, and exceptionalism. Governor Paterson's short-lived pardon panel of-
fers just such familiar narratives. But it was also unprecedented due to its sin-
gular mission of helping New Yorkers avoid immigration consequences and its
potential influence as a model for the exercise of state executive authority to
achieve this goal.
In many cases a full and unconditional pardon represents an extraordinary
remedy which is used as a last resort to prevent additional or unjust harm or
restore rights to individuals who are facing consequences for their past behav-
ior that are disproportionate to their current circumstances. It is this propor-
tionality principle that offers the most fitting justification for using the pardon
power expressly to preclude deportation. Using pardons in this way can reme-
diate in cases where the conduct that is the basis of the deportation does not
warrant such a drastic, often permanent repercussion.
The expulsion of undesirable non-citizens has been woven into immigration
laws since 1917, but early-twentieth-century legislators could not have
imagined today's broad categories of non-citizens vulnerable to deportation.
Unlike the loss of other civil rights or privileges that other laws might restore,
even one hundred years ago deportation received unique treatment when the
pardon clause was written into the statute itself. The contemporaneous con-
gressional debates recognized and preserved a place for mercy and forgiveness
for non-citizens faced with extreme outcome of expulsion. Both these debates
"I Barkow, supra note 149, at 154 (describing how some governors have cited religious
faith as a reason for granting some form of clemency).
152 A broader, more vigorous use of state executive discretion with the explicit goal of
providing tools to avoid deportation or to remove bars to other potential relief might send a
message to Congress that a reconsideration of current categorical, inflexible federal legisla-
tion is timely. MOORE, supra note 18, at 223-24 (giving as one example the amnesties in the
1990s to out-of-status immigrants that drew attention to the need to reform unjust immigra-
tion laws).
153 Like Governor Ryan's system-wide death row clemency action, Governor Paterson
created his pardon panel at the very end of his term in office. This timing mitigates the risk
of political fall-out for an individual governor. But if a pardon was not the creature of
personal initiative but an institutionalized system of regular government, this concern would
be irrelevant since the decision-making would be more objective, formalized, and transpar-
ent.
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and the Supreme Court (for more than a century) resisted characterizing depor-
tation as "punishment."' 54 Yet, these early lawmakers acknowledged that de-
portation is often disproportionate to the moral culpability of the underlying
offense, and inescapably more punitive than other collateral consequences of a
conviction. They therefore enacted special options to be exercised in individual
cases in order to avoid an injustice.'
The value of an immigration pardon in this context is highly personalized
since it is principally the individual and his or her family who immediately
benefit. But there are unquestionable public benefits that ripple outward: to
employers; to the local or state government that might have to pay public bene-
fits following the loss of a wage earner; to public safety that results from stable
families; and to the public purse in the form of taxes and Social Security pay-
ments. At bottom, perhaps the most noteworthy message of these pardons is
the recognition of the United States as a "nation of immigrants."' 5 6 Because
individuality should matter in deportation decisions, a pardon provides a
method to rationalize the relationship between the objective deportable act and
its subjective consequences.
The benefits of a properly administered gubernatorial pardon system would
outweigh the costs of deportation by protecting a state's residents from the
deracination of family unity and structure while protecting the state from the
economic and societal costs of family separation, displacement, and insecurity.
Governors probably have much more access to the pulse of their communities
and constituents than presidents. They are in a position to more knowledgeably
and accurately assess the impact of deportation on the state's families, econo-
my, and social structure. A governor likely would be in a better position to
reliably assess the individual's contributions to the family, economy, and socie-
ty within the more familiar boundaries of the state's interests and environment.
A program specifically dedicated to continuous, systematic consideration of
pardons for immigrants would have to differ from the non-transparent current
practice that lacks any clear, consistent, and accessible standards. The very
essence of the power is its consolidation in the executive branch as a form of
154 For more than one hundred years, since Fong Yue Ting, v. United States, 14 U.S. 698,
730 (1893), Supreme Court jurisprudence has clung to the distinction that deportation is a
civil, not a criminal, proceeding. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594
(1952); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135,
154 (1945); see also Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1299, 1311-12 (2011).
155 The relationship between the criminal conviction and a resulting deportation was
pointed out by Justice Stevens in Padilla: "[A]s a matter of federal law, deportation is an
integral part-indeed, sometimes the most important part-of the penalty that may be im-
posed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes." 559 U.S. at -, 130
S. Ct. at 1480.
156 This coining of this ubiquitous phrase is attributed to the title of President John F.
Kennedy's book, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS, published posthumously in 1964.
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relief of last resort so that in principle any executive could pardon any person
without explanation or justification. Opacity and authoritarianism usually re-
sult in criticism of the process, however, and thus undermines its credibility
regardless of the merits of a specific case. Therefore, to be legitimate, any
expansion or regularization of the use of the pardon power for non-citizens
must be supported by a carefully designed program to administer this incredible
benefit. Many people have recommended changes and improvements to the
processes of obtaining a pardon or other form of clemency to enhance its legiti-
macy. For example, to avoid accusations of self-interest, a clemency program
should include rigorous application and decision-making procedures that safe-
guard due process.' 5 7 Others have urged that all pardon decisions be accompa-
nied by a written justification for the decision. 15
The obvious values of consistency and transparency would assure greater
public acceptance of such a project. Governors who fear pushback from their
constituencies can protect themselves by carefully developing and articulating
factors that would be weighed in the exercise of this discretion. To both insu-
late from the inevitable political pressure by special interests to grant particular
pardons and to exercise their discretion objectively and equitably, governors
should utilize strong and legitimate clemency institutions such as pardon com-
missions or boards staffed by credible and politically and ideologically neutral
professionals.159
In a single month in 2010, the New York State Immigration Pardon Panel
considered more than 1,100 applications.' 60 Governor Paterson granted a total
of thirty-three pardons (in addition to pardoning Qing Hong Wu), hardly an
overwhelming percentage of the total number of applications filed.161 Charac-
terizing federal immigration laws as "often inflexible, arbitrarily applied and
157 Love, supra note 28, at 1208. There are detailed regulations and considerable public-
ly available information governing the application process at 28 C.F.R. Part I; see also U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Pardon Information and Instructions, available at http://www.justice.gov/
pardon/pardoninstructions.htm.
"8 MOORE, supra note 18, at 220.
'19 Many states have such entities. See LovE, supra note 120, at 22-36 (reviewing mod-
els for administration of pardon power); see also Ridolfi & Gordon, supra note 27, at 9-15
(state-by-state chart of clemency structure, limitations and procedures).
160 Press Release, New York State Governor David A. Paterson, Governor Paterson An-
nounces Pardons (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.governor.ny.gov/archive/paterson/press/120610
Pardons.html.
161 This total was derived from three press releases issued during December, 2010 identi-
fying the recipients and summarizing the background of each pardon. See supra note 160 as
well as Press Release, New York State Governor David A. Paterson, Governor Paterson
Announces Pardons (Dec. 24, 2010), available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/archive/
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excessively harsh,"l 62 he granted this extraordinary benefit with a clear set of
criteria in mind:
I have selected cases that exemplify the values of New York State and that
of a just society: atonement, forgiveness, compassion, realism, open arms,
and not retribution, punitiveness and a refusal to acknowledge the worth of
immigration. I will not turn my back on New Yorkers who enrich our
lives and care for those who suffer.'63
For the most part, the pardons granted by Governor Paterson reflected these
values in action. Those pardoned included grandparents, professionals,
caregivers of handicapped relatives, and veterans." A pardon in the immigra-
tion context is not just a manifestation of individual forgiveness, nor solely a
public benefit, but also a reaffirmation of membership that has been earned and
does not deserve to be stripped without an opportunity for an individualized
consideration of equities. While their circumstances were not identical, those
pardoned shared many characteristics suggesting that it was not difficult then,
nor would it be difficult in the future, to design criteria and standards for grant-
ing pardons for individuals facing deportation solely as a result of the criminal
convictions for which they have already been punished.
There already are several examples of methodologies that assign a value to
defined characteristics and situations in order to achieve a fair and consistent
outcome that enhances the legitimacy of the system. The most obvious exam-
ple is the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual.165 In calculating a sentence
range, the Guidelines assign points based upon the nature of the crime and the
nature of the offender, thereby eliminating perceived disparities in individual-
ized sentencing by reducing judicial discretion. Although imperfect in the
criminal system, the Guidelines could be instructive in the immigration context.
They are detailed, structured, and objective, but also more flexible since the
Supreme Court in United States v. Booker held that they were advisory and
sentences were subject to a "reasonableness" review.' 66 The Guideline system
now gives judges more discretion to consider without limitation any facts relat-
162 Press Release, New York State Governor David A. Paterson, Governor Paterson An-
nounces Pardons (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.governor.ny.gov/archive/paterson/press/122410
-GovPatersonAnnouncesPardons.htm.
163 Id.
'" See infra Appendix for a complete list of all pardons.
161 See generally U.S. SENTENCINc; GUIDELINES MANUAL (2011). In a complex matrix
that examines many factors, the crime, its manner of commission, information about the
victim, and the personal circumstances of the offender, a federal judge arrives at a sentencing
range, but even then, the judge can depart from the Guideline sentence in a range of circum-
stances. See id. at 584 (discussing grounds for departure from the standard sentencing
range).
'6 543 U.S. 2230, 222-25 (2005).
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ing to "the background, character and conduct" of the defendant.' 67
Another system for weighing equities recently was introduced in the immi-
gration context by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). A series of
so-called Prosecutorial Discretion memos issued in 2011 rely on factors that
balance the individual's circumstances against the goals of removal.168 While
the memos do not allocate points to particular factors, they do afford a frame-
work for decision-making about initiating or continuing removal proceedings.
These factors embody some of the same judgments about background, charac-
ter and conduct that are typically embedded in the guidelines systems and in
current forms of relief in the INA including length of residence, age, education,
family ties and responsibilities, military service, and contributions to the com-
munity.169
There are also examples of point systems developed in some immigrant-re-
ceiving countries that could serve as models for a pardon scheme. Canada 70
and New Zealand' 7 1 have established point calculators that quantify certain
qualifications and characteristics. Because these points are used to predict
whether an individual would be a successful permanent immigrant, they tend to
base the admission decision of new immigrants on their likely future contribu-
tions to the country's economy. A pardon point system would have to look in
both directions-past and future. First, it would weigh past conduct-the facts
and circumstances of the crime and the sentence that are the basis for deporta-
tion and how the individual's behavior during the time between the conviction
and the deportation proceeding demonstrates rehabilitation as well as the odds
against repeat criminal conduct. Then, the system would be charged with pre-
dicting the future, in effect deciding whether the immigrant deserves to remain,
167 18 U.S.C.A. § 3661 (2006).
168 Memorandum, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immi-
gration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal
of Aliens (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/
prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf; Memorandum, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-
who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf; Memorandum, Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities
for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://
www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/1l0302washingtondc.pdf.
169 Memorandum, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immi-
gration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal
of Aliens (June 17, 2011), at 4-5.
170 See Citizenship and Immigration-Canada, Backgrounder-Overview of the New Fed-
eral Skilled Worker Program, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/apply-factors
.asp. (last visited Mar. 24, 2013); Points Calculator for Canadian Immigration, CANADIAN
VISA (Oct. 21, 2009), http://canadianvisa.comlnews/canada-immigration/201 1/points-calcu-
lator-for-canada-immigration (last visited June 18, 2012).
171 See Points Indicator, IMMIGRATION NEw ZEALAND, http://www.immigration.govt.nz/
pointsindicator (last visited June 18, 2012).
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based on this accumulation of historical evidence. While no system is perfect
and the particular assignment of points could always be disputed, the funda-
mental values that relief from removal have always expressed-ties to the
United States, good character, effects on close relatives with lawful status-
could be embodied, refined, and fine-tuned to establish a workable formula.
Such a formula allows the immigration system to pay attention to individual
lives and provides individuals and their supporters the opportunity to offset the
fact of a criminal conviction with a life otherwise well-led.
As the volume of applications to the Paterson Pardon Panel demonstrated so
clearly, many people would apply for this relief. Although there would not be a
quota, probably only few ultimately would merit this benefit.17 2 But a point or
factorial system would operationalize the values that clearly influence this pro-
cess, making it simpler, more consistent, more predictable, and more efficient.
Certain point levels would assure a pardon while a score under a certain figure
would assure denial. Assuming the point system is publicly available, as is the
case for the Canadian and New Zealand immigration authorities, anyone who
could not achieve the minimum number of points simply would not bother
applying, thus diminishing the volume of work for the panel.' 73 Only those
applicants whose total points fell in between the presumptive grant and denial
scores would require closer individual scrutiny. A system that is built on
greater transparency and predictable consistency would result in greater admin-
istrative efficiency, and most importantly, increased public confidence when
the reasoning behind individual decisions can be understood and even docu-
mented.
The balancing process starts, of course, with the threat of deportation and its
lifetime consequences of long separation, potential permanent exile, and inevi-
table dislocation.'7 4 Against this fate, factors that fall into three broad yet inter-
related categories would be assessed. These categories-affiliation-assimila-
tion, character, and humanitarian factors-reflect the same equities that would
be considered in granting pardons in general, without concern about immigra-
tion consequences. Most are already built into existing forms of immigration
relief so should not be controversial. If a sufficient number and quality of the
factors are present when weighted and aggregated, it would be easy to defend a
pardon that precludes deportation, or at least opens the door to forms of relief
under the INA barred by a conviction. Some factors, such as the vintage of the
172 See supra note 162.
'1 See supra notes 169-170. Having taken the self-assessment test, I would not be eligi-
ble to immigrate to either country.
'7 Anyone ordered removed is barred for either: ten years (for a first removal); twenty
years (for subsequent removals); or permanently (for a conviction for an aggravated felony).
8 U.S.C.A. § I182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (2010) (commonly known as Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1959 § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)).
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conviction and its relative insignificance, might even be convincing enough to
make the person categorically eligible for a pardon.
(1) Affiliation Factors 75
Factors in this category largely focus upon the connections forged to the U.S. in
terms of time, stake in the community, family, and lack of ties to another coun-
try.
* Length of residence or presence in the United States.176
* Age at time of initial entry to United States.
* Amount of time spent in country of origin.
* Family ties in country of origin.
* Span of time between initial entry and commission of the disqualifying
crime.
* Span of time between commission of disqualifying crime and commence-
ment of removal proceedings.
* Stakes in the community (any of these factors singly or in combination are
relevant but not mandatory).
* Having United States citizen ("USC") or Lawful Permanent Resident
("LPR") immediate and extended family members without regard to hard-
ship.
* Hardship to any other individuals or groups.




While not all of this information was available for every person pardoned by
175 This term is used by Hiroshi Motomura to describe how immigration laws provide
waivers or exemptions of deportation based on length of time spent in the U.S. as lawful
permanent residents. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING 96-100 (2006). "[T]he
treatment of lawful immigrants ... should depend on the ties that they have formed in this
country." Id. at I1. Motomura believes that this thinking explains, among other things, the
JRAD. Id. at 99.
176 Eligibility could, but should not necessarily, be limited to lawful permanent residents
(LPRs). Governor Paterson limited his pardons to immigrants in legal status, and, judging
by the descriptions, they were all lawful permanent residents as opposed to non-immigrants
in legal status, e.g., students or temporary employees. See Press Release, Governor Paterson
(Dec. 24), supra note 161. This is an appealing limitation since it is more likely that individ-
uals in this status would satisfy many of the other criteria, and, like Mr. Wu, their circum-
stances would be more sympathetic to the public. But, the INA itself permits waivers of
removal for eligible long-term non-LPRs, including people with no immigration status,
based on time, good character, and hardship to immediate relatives. 8 U.S.C. §1229b, INA
§ 240A(b). There may be an understandable political or practical reason to restrict pardons
to LPRs, but there is no legal basis for this limitation.
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Governor Paterson, a few cases illustrate these affiliation factors particularly
well:
Frances Novoa, who is now 63 years old, [was] being threatened with removal
for attempted petit larceny convictions from 1984 and 1974, for which she was
sentenced to a conditional discharge. Novoa is gainfully employed, and pro-
vides stability to one of her daughters and three of her grandchildren, who
would suffer a serious disruption of their lives and extreme emotional harm if
she were to be deported."'
Walter Mills, now 60-years-old, was convicted of attempted possession of a
firearm in 1973 and was sentenced to a conditional discharge. In the 37 years
since this conviction, he has had no other contact with the criminal justice
system. He now works full time and cares for his 82-year-old mother.'7 8
Jose Palma has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since
1971, but faces deportation as a result of a first-degree reckless endangerment
conviction from 1978, for which he served 60 days in jail and five years on
probation. He has lived an exemplary life during the 30 years since he was
released from parole supervision, having become a business owner and raising
his three children with his wife of over 30 years.1 79
(2) Character Factors
Everyone pardoned has been convicted of a crime, so there is at least one
blot on his or her character. Accepting that, however, there are some clear fac-
tors that would tip the scale toward pardon, and the absence of which would
militate against favorable treatment.
* The nature of the crime itself and any explanation for its commission.
* The length of time since the commission of the crime.
* The number of convictions the individual has incurred.
* The relative lack of seriousness of the crime, i.e., degree of offense, lack of
violence or injury.
* The sentence itself and whether and how long ago it was completed.
* The individual's positive activities while serving or since the completion
of the punishment.
* Do those activities represent rehabilitation and/or expressions of remorse?
* Do these activities benefit others and/or society?
* United States military service.
"7 See Press Release, New York State Governor David A. Paterson, Governor Paterson
Announces Pardons, at 3 (Dec. 24, 2010), http://www.governor.ny.gov/archive/paterson/
press/122410-GovPatersonAnnouncesPardons.html (last visited June 17, 2012).
178 Id.
1 Id. at 5.
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* Contributions to society.
The following stories exemplify character factors, although many also re-
present factors relating to affiliation and assimilation:
Clint Ramos was convicted of four counts of Grand Larceny in the Third De-
gree in June 2001, and he was sentenced to five years on probation. At the
time of his conviction, Ramos was severely drug addicted, but he has since
overcome that addiction and has been a sponsor for more than 10 persons in
recovery. Ramos has become an award-winning costume and set designer and
is well known and respected in the New York Theater community. His pardon
application has received overwhelming support from numerous members of
that community, who describe him as a brilliant and innovative artist as well as
an asset of real value to the American theater.80
[Mario Benitez immigrated to the United States from the Dominican Republic
in 1978, when he was 26 years old, and a few years later he served honorably
in the United States Navy.] In 1988, Mr. Benitez pled guilty to second-degree
criminal sale of a controlled substance and was sentenced to 8 years to life in
prison. While in prison, Mr. Benitez was a "role model" inmate, who earned a
Bachelors Degree in Accounting and, upon release, began working at the City
University of New York's (CUNY) Lehman College. After passing the CPA
exam in 1997, he has risen to jobs with higher levels of responsibility, and
today he is the Assistant Director of Finance for CUNY's Graduate School and
University Center in charge of a budget in excess of $60 million. Mr. Benitez,
who was discharged from parole supervision after only 3 years, has been in-
volved in numerous community activities in the Bronx, including one-on-one
youth mentoring. He is married and has 4 daughters, all of whom are United
States citizens. 81
Carol Hamilton, now a Reverend, was convicted of two class A misdemeanors
of Criminal Possession of Marijuana in the Fourth Degree in 1995 and 1986,
for which he was sentenced to a conditional discharge and a fine, respectively.
He has now earned a Bachelors and a Masters Degree and works as an or-
dained minister, counseling youth, ex-offenders and people living with HIVI
AIDS. A pardon should assist him in fighting his deportation, allowing him to
remain in the United States with his wife and three young children.182
180 See Press Release, Governor Paterson (Dec. 30), supra note 161.
181 See Press Release, Governor Paterson (Dec. 6), supra note 160.
182 See Press Release, Governor Paterson (Dec. 24), supra note 161.
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Neil Drew has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since he
was 10 years old. He was convicted of third-degree grand larceny in 1998, for
which he served a one-to-three year sentence and made restitution. He has
earned a Bachelors Degree from the School of Visual Arts in New York City
and has been gainfully employed as a graphic designer. His two brothers serve
in the U.S. military.18 3
(3) Humanitarian Factors
These factors concentrate on the consequences of removal, usually resulting
in hardship or harm to the individual or to others who have a stake in the
United States. Current hardship calculations are too restrictive and tend to
weigh too heavily in the balancing process. Hardship to others who have a
right to remain in the United States (USCs and LPRs) is already a requirement
in some existing forms of relief. But the threshold is enormously high-either
"extreme hardship" 84 or "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship"'8 5
and can only affect qualified immediate relatives. In general, the hardship as-
sessment should be less demanding and more inclusive. Hardship should not
be mandatory for a pardon, but rather an important factor. Hardship considera-
tions for pardons should include not just circumstances where the deportation
would hurt a limited class of close relatives, but the impact of removal on the
USC or LPR himself or herself. Finally, in cases where the individual original-
ly was granted humanitarian relief, such as asylum, deportation to a country of
persecution should weigh heavily in favor of a pardon. Humanitarian factors
include:
* Hardship to USC or LPR family members.
* Hardship to the individual facing deportation.
* Having USC or LPR family members, regardless of hardship:
* Effect on their education.
* Effect on their physical and/or mental health.
* Effect on social welfare.
* Effect on financial welfare.
* Having family members on active duty in the U.S. military.
* Whether the individual was admitted as a refugee having been persecuted
in his or her country of origin.
* The current conditions in that country.
* Correcting an injustice incurred by the original conviction or sentence.
Some of these humanitarian factors played a large role in the following ex-
amples of pardons, although other compelling factors were also present.
183 Id.
'8 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(h) (2010) INA § 212(h).
185 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b) (2010), INA § 240A(b).
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Marlon Oscar Powell lawfully immigrated to this country from Jamaica in
1986, when he was 13 years old. When he was 15 years old, he was convicted
of using a fake ID to gain admission to a club where he was arrested for misde-
meanor drug possession and sentenced to 9 months in jail under the mistaken
belief that he was then 21 years old. Had Mr. Powell properly been considered
a Youthful Offender, his misdemeanor crime would not be deportable. In the
20 years since his release, he has become a productive member of society,
maintaining steady employment and supporting and raising his 4 young chil-
dren.'86
Deborah Salako-Nation has been a lawful permanent resident of the United
States since 1974, when she was 5 years old. She has been ordered deported to
Nigeria as a result of three convictions from 1999 and 2000, for second-degree
forgery (a class D felony), petit larceny (a class A misdemeanor) and third-
degree forgery (a class A misdemeanor). In the decade since those convictions,
Ms. Salako-Nation has worked steadily in order to support her college-age son
and her 6-year-old autistic son. Like many legal immigrants, Ms. Salako-Na-
tion was placed in removal proceedings after she applied for citizenship. She
faces imminent deportation to Nigeria, a country with which she has no ties,
since her parents and siblings are all citizens of the United States. Her depor-
tation would be devastating for her autistic son, who relies on her for his medi-
cal and educational needs; many of these services would not be available in
Nigeria were she to take him with her.'8 7
Khamsay Chanthavilaychit received a pardon for an August 2003 conviction
for the Class A misdemeanor of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth
Degree, for which he was sentenced to a three-year term of probation.
Chanthavilaychit was brought to this county at age two, as a war refugee from
Laos, and he has been gainfully employed for the last 16 years. He is currently
facing removal after being placed in proceedings when he applied for and was
denied naturalization.'8 8
These histories, and all of the other cases where pardons were granted exem-
plify how using the pardon power can inject principles of mercy and forgive-
ness into immigration law. Most cases would hardly strike anyone as contro-
versial or undeserving. Given the perfect storm of laws that expanded grounds
of deportation and made some retroactive, and either eliminated forms of equi-
table relief or made them more demanding,' 89 the gubernatorial pardon authori-
186 See Press Release, Governor Paterson (Dec. 6), supra note 160.
187 See id.
188 See Press Release, Governor Paterson (Dec. 30), supra note 161.
189 One comprehensive critique of the 1996 statutes and their effect on criminal deporta-
tion is Nancy Morawetz, Symposium: Understanding The Impact of the 1996 Deportation
Lws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L.R. 1936, 1938-43 (2000).
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ty offers an appealing alternative, as Governor Paterson so eloquently under-
stood and advocated.
A pardon awarded expressly for immigration purposes can elegantly sidestep
any hardnosed concerns about leniency for criminals by joining the public in-
terest with the individual interest. Our society wants to encourage acceptance
of responsibility and rehabilitation, reward good behavior, spare harm to inno-
cent victims, and send an expressive message about the possibilities for a better
life available to immigrants. The possibility of exile may not have been con-
templated at the time of most of these low-level convictions. Yet, the stakes
are so high that if the plight of any one of the people on Paterson's list was
widely known, the draconian fate of deportation would offend not only that
person's neighbors, co-workers, or co-congregants, but also the public at large.
That certainly was the reaction that Qing Hong Wu's story provoked.
Gubernatorial pardons speak eloquently about the impact of a collateral con-
sequence on a specific community. Governors can take more risks when mak-
ing decisions on a smaller, localized scale. If such a program were operational-
ized over a period of time, it would become routine, with costs and benefits
clearly understood by the public. Other state citizens would support individu-
als-their neighbors, their friends, their colleagues at work or on committees-
seeking pardons and would understand the immediate negative impact of de-
portation on job sites, schools, places of worship, or neighborhoods.' 90 In addi-
tion, families who lose their support system probably require government fi-
nancial support following the deportation of a breadwinner.19' States (and
counties or cities as well) often bear the social burdens and actual costs of
190 Ben Forer, Alabama Immigration Law Causes Hispanics To Leave Schools, ABC
NEwS, Oct. 4, 2011, available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/alabama-immigration-law-his-
panics-leave-schools/story?id=14663550#.ThXTOlxUfM.
191 SETH FREED WESSLER, APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, SHATTERED FAMILIES, THE PER-
n1OUS INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM,
(Nov. 2, 2011, 8:00am), available at http://colorlines.com/archives/2011/11/
thousands of kids lost infosterhomes-aftelparentsdeportation.html; A REPORT BY
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP TO THE URBAN INSTITUTE, SEVERING A LIFELINE: THE NEGLECT
OF CITIZEN CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICY (2009), available
at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyProBonoSeveringLifeline_- ReportOnly-web.
pdf; DHS reported that 46,486 individuals who claimed at least 1 USC child were deported
in the first six months of 2011. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPORTA-
TION OF PARENTS OF U.S.-BORN CITIZENS: FISCAL YEAR 2011 SECOND SEMI-ANNUAL RE-
PORT TO CONGRESS 6 (Mar. 26, 2012), available at http://www.lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/07/ICE-DEPORT-OF-PARENTS-OF-US-CIT-FY-20 1 .pdf (on file with author); Jac-
queline Hagan, Brianna Castro & Nestor Rodriguez The Effects of U.S. Deportation Policies
on Immigrant Families and Communities: Cross-Border Perspectives, 88. 1799, 1813-22
(2010) (drawing on several studies conducted over a ten-year period, the authors show N.C.
L.R how U.S. enforcement policies have disrupted family ties and created stress in commu-
nities in which immigrants live and work.
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deportation, so their constituencies would appreciate the resulting savings.192
Deportation may produce even worse consequences to families who face a
choice of either taking USC or LPR dependents to countries to which they have
no connections and where they will probably lead less advantaged lives,' 93 or
abandoning children to foster care or non-family caregivers. 194
State-level action in the immigration realm can also communicate a political
message to federal legislators. Arizona's anti-immigrant efforts (which in-
spired Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina and other states to pass similar laws)
demonstrate frustration with under-enforcement of immigration laws by the
federal government. Concerted pro-immigrant measures could equally and
forcefully communicate state views about immigration over-enforcement. In-
stitutionalized, functioning state panels or commissions, operating with integri-
ty and transparency, and shining light on the injustices of overzealous immigra-
tion laws and enforcement, might cause federal legislators to question whether
the current restrictions of the INA are unjust and require reform.
V. CONCLUSION
The elegance of this proposal to invigorate the pardon power for the purpose
of avoiding deportations derives from the existing, but underappreciated and
underutilized law. A governor can rely on current federal law without requir-
ing new or amended federal legislation.' 95 Like the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion that results in the non-initiation or termination of deportation pro-
ceedings, the pardon power is situated in executive discretion that can be sub-
ject to standards, regulation, and oversight, assuming that the pardon decision is
depoliticized.
"Governors' consciences are often good guides to injustice."1 96 To grant
pardons to individuals who fit the criteria discussed above is both a demonstra-
tion of humanity and a wise political gesture. Hopefully, a successful experi-
192 This is an extension of the argument advanced by Arizona at the Supreme Court.
Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), (No. 11-182),
Brief for Petitioner, at 6-7.
" Damien Cave, American Children, Now Struggling to Adjust to Life in Mexico, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 2012, at Al.
194 SHATrERED FAMILIES, supra note 191, at 163 (reporting that 5,100 children of deport-
ed parents live in foster care).
'95 In a recent article, the author proposes a new statute entitled "The Longtime Lawful
Permanent Residents and Family Unit Relief Act" which builds on Cancellation of Removal
but allows consideration of the proportionality of deportation as it relates to the underlying
criminal conviction that forms the basis of removal and blocks relief, and lists a series of
factors to consider as a matter of discretion. Maritza 1. Reyes, Constitutionalizing Immigra-
tion Law: The Vital Role of Judicial Discretion in the Removal of Lawful Permanent Re-
sidents, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 637, 693-94 (2012).
196 MOORE, supra note 18, at 223. The author points to examples of clemency in cases
involving the death penalty, child teenage felons, and mental incompetents.
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ence with the use of pardons to aid deserving immigrants to remain in the
United States would inspire other governors to develop similar programs. To
date, however, these efforts have not gained momentum, either in New York or
elsewhere. Governor Cuomo has neither adopted the practice of his predeces-
sor, nor followed the resolution of the New York City Council.' 97 Nor has he
openly taken the pulse of his constituents to see what public reaction might be
to a permanent pardon panel. In the world of executive pardons, a governor
really has little to lose since his or her authority, by the very nature of pardons,
is exclusive and unreviewable.
As thousands of additional clemency applications are filed, with compelling
claims to remain in the United States, Governor Cuomo or any one of his forty-
nine counterparts may decide to reestablish a pardon panel and reinvigorate the
effort to lead the nation in setting an example of generosity, forgiveness, flexi-
bility, and resolve. Seize the law.
197 See supra note 139.
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APPENDIX
PARDONS ISSUED IN NEW YORK DURING DECEMBER 2010
Date of
Name Crime/Offense Offense
Allen, Tressan Att. Possession of Marijuana (misdemeanor) 2002
Auyeung, Kevin Robbery ? (Convicted
at age 17)
Benitez, Mario Sale of Controlled Substance 1988
Broomfield, Sanjay Possession of Weapons (misdemeanor) 2005
Camacho, Luz Marina Possession and Sale of Controlled Substance 1983
Carter, Ian Att. Sale of Stolen Property 1994
Chanthavilaychit, Possession of Weapon 2003
Khamsay
Colas, Edouard Att. Burglary 1997
Cruz, Lucila Att. Grand Larceny 1996
Dandapani, Vijay Grand Larceny 1993
Drew, Neil Grand Larceny 1998
Gonzalez, Salvador Assault 1975
Guzman, Engels R. Robbery 1990
Hamilton, Carol Possession of Marijuana 1986 & 1995
Johnson, Olusegun Ola Forgery and Grand Larceny 1990
Mills, Walter Att. Possession of Firearm 1973
Montesquieu, Pedro Att. Sale of Controlled Substance 1994
Moya de Leon, Possession of Controlled Substance 1994
Francisco
Novoa, Frances Att. Petit Larceny 1974 & 1984
Palma, Jose Reckless Endangerment 1978
Parker, Angela Sale of Controlled Substance / Assault 1989
Powell, Marion Oscar Possession of Fake ID (misdemeanor) 1988
Prado, Aqustin Possession of Controlled Substance 1993
(misdemeanor)
Ramirez, Juan P. Unknown misdemeanors 2003
Ramos, Clint Grand Larceny 2001
Ramsaran, Darshini Robbery ?
Rhodon, Laurenton Att. Possession of Controlled Substance 1995
Rojas, Fredy C. Possession of Controlled Substance 1995
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Date of
Name Crime/Offense Offense
Sanchez, Jose Possession of Controlled Substance 1989
Salako-Nation, Forgery 1999 & 2000
Deborah
Sinclair, Melbourne Sale of Marijuana (misdemeanor) 1990
Valerio, Eligio Sale of Controlled Substance and Possession 1986
of Weapons
Valentin de la Cruz, Assault 1984
Randy
